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ABSTRACT
When sharing data across multiple sites, service applications should not be trusted au-
tomatically. Services that are suspected of faulty, erroneous, or malicious behaviors, or that
run on systems that may be compromised, should not be able to gain access to protected
data or entrusted with the same data access rights as others. This thesis proposes a con-
text flow model that controls the information flow in a distributed system. Each service
application along with its surrounding context in a distributed system is treated as a con-
trollable principal. This thesis defines a trust-based access control model that controls the
information exchange between these principals. An online monitoring framework is used
to evaluate the trustworthiness of the service applications and the underlining systems. An
external communication interception runtime framework enforces trust-based access con-
trol transparently for the entire system.
xii
SUMMARY
While sharing data across distributed machines is critical for modern IT applications,
it also raises issues of maintaining desired data privacy and protecting data from inappro-
priate disclosure. However, it is difficult to retain controls on the data that is being shared
in environments where services can be composed and deployed dynamically across dis-
tributed providers. To protect sensitive information against potential risks of inappropriate
disclosures, access rights of applications to data should not only depend on their functional
characteristics, but also on their as well as the underlying systems’ behaviors. Stated more
explicitly, applications that are suspected of faulty, erroneous, or malicious behaviors, or
that run on systems that may be compromised, should not be able to gain access to protected
data or entrusted with the same data access rights as others.
There exist many sophisticated prevention-based mechanisms to eliminate risks of in-
appropriate disclosures. However, there are cases where such risks are associated with the
core functionality of the system. This thesis tries to provide a remedy for scenarios where
such risks cannot be directly eliminated. The idea is to detect existing risks, then evaluate
whether it is tolerable to share certain information under such risks.
This thesis proposes a context flow model (CFC) that controls the information flow in
a distributed system. Each service application along with its surrounding context in the
distributed system is treated as a controllable principal. CFC defines an access control
model that controls the information exchange between these principals. The access control
model has three main parts. First, an online monitoring framework is used to evaluate the
trustworthiness of context of the service applications and the underlining systems. Second,
a trust-based access control (TBAC) specification determines the permitted information
xiii
exchanges considering the active contexts of the service applications. Third, an external
communication interception runtime framework enforces the above specification transpar-
ently for the entire distributed system. When there are multiple principals participating in
the same information flow, the same TBAC specification is applied uniformly on all prin-
cipals. In this way, we provide the protection guarantee throughout the entire information
flow path, thus efficiently converting the path into a trusted data path (TDP).
The most important principle guiding the design and implementation of the CFC model
is the integrity of the model itself. Since we do not trust the service applications and the
underlying systems automatically, we place the risk evaluation and associated monitoring
components of the CFC model into isolated domains, which are domains that are not sub-
ject to the same attacks or failures targeting applications and general purpose operating
systems. We have implemented a prototype of trusted data paths leveraging virtualization
technologies. The TDP software deploys online monitoring agents into privileged domains
in platforms virtualized with the Xen hypervisor to assure the reliability of monitoring re-
sults. The TDP software also transparently intercepts communications between service
applications, at the driver level in privileged domains. Using this technique, sensitive in-
formation that is not suitable for the current context can be automatically removed, without
application involvement.
The TDP approach offers system support for protecting data access in environments
where systems and services are subject to failures, programming errors, and attacks. It
presents a system-level solution for fine-grained protection on data sharing in distributed
systems. It particularly targets systems (1) that lack the extensibility to include context fac-
tors via built-in security mechanisms, such as legacy software; (2) that are subject to attack
or are suspected of faulty behaviors themselves; (3) that wish to delegate context-based con-
trols to external partners; and (4) that want to enforce context-based control ubiquitously
instead of only at the source or sink. Applications that can benefit from the CFC-TBAC
xiv
model range from web applications like search and knowledge management or digital con-
tent services, to healthcare information systems, to file sharing systems using mail servers




Modern distributed systems are constructed as sets of cooperating service applications shar-
ing data across distributed machines. Such service applications may be composed dynam-
ically ‘on demand’, run locally or by external partners, and linked via dynamic or static
contractual agreements. The spectrum ranges from traditional settings in which all service
applications run in a single private data center to new approaches in which select service
applications are dynamically offloaded to public clouds. In all such cases but particularly
when services are running across multiple organizations, it is essential for applications to
be able to safely share sensitive information. A typical healthcare information system [6]
run by hospitals, for instance, shares patient information with doctors and nurses for treat-
ment purposes, with external doctors for reviewing, with insurance agencies for billing, and
with researchers for long term analysis, under the guidelines of federal and state regulations
[63]. Operational information systems like those run by Delta Air Lines [47], interact with
numerous external services, including for flight searches [42], ticket payment processing,
revenue management, catering functions, and many others.
When sharing data across multiple sites, issues to be dealt with include maintaining de-
sired data privacy, protecting the data being shared from inappropriate disclosures caused
by unreliable or faulty partners [62]. However, modern systems make it difficult to retain
the controls needed for maintaining strong data protection. For any given communica-
tion involving information sharing, there exist multiple hidden parties other than the data
provider and the requester who have the opportunities to touch the data [56]. There are
kernel modules that can ‘peek’ on the communication through socket buffers directly. In-
side service applications, there are plugin extensions that can view the data even in plain
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text mode. File writing operations and data output operations like those that send out
emails from service applications, constitute additional ways to disclose data to new par-
ties. Although it might be legitimate for these parties to access the data, they also represent
potential risks concerning inappropriate data disclosures. Systems and applications’ misbe-
haviors or programming errors can turn such risks into real damages. Attackers can exploit
system vulnerabilities to create such parties, or compromise existing ones to steal the data.
This thesis seeks to develop improved system support for protecting data access in en-
vironments where applications rely on the use of shared or remote services, use shared
underlying hardware, and where systems and applications are subject to failures, program-
ming errors and attacks. The approach taken in this thesis and articulated in the following
thesis statement is one in which applications operating on data are not trusted automatically.
Thesis Statement The access rights of applications to data should not only depend
on functional application characteristics, but also on the dynamic application and un-
derlying system behaviors. Stated more explicitly, services that are suspected of faulty,
erroneous, or malicious behaviors, or that run on systems that may be compromised,
should not be able to gain access to protected data and/or entrusted with the same
data access rights as others.
There exist many sophisticated prevention-based mechanisms to eliminate some of the
above risks, ranging from tools like general purpose anti-virus software [43, 46, 58], to
corporate firewalls [7], to secure operating systems [39], to information system audit so-
lutions and many others. However, there are cases where such risks are associated with
the core functionality of the system. For instance, the risks of malicious plugins are a side
effect of the service extensibility, the latter being an important property of service-based
systems. This thesis tries to provide a remedy for scenarios where such risks cannot be
directly eliminated. The idea is to detect existing risks, then evaluate whether it is tolera-
ble to share certain information under such risks. Our research work is motivated by the
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observations that different data has different levels of tolerance concerning data leakage
and that different users have different risk profiles [48]. Concerning data, general personal
information like email addresses, for instance, should be treated differently from financial
information like credit card numbers. Concerning risk profiles, users within corporate fire-
walls operate with a different level of risk than those using public internet connection. As a
result, it is desirable to permit controlled information sharing to achieve a balance between
risks of inappropriate data disclosures and functionalities of application services.
This thesis proposes a context flow model (CFC) that controls the information flow in
a distributed system. Each service application along with its surrounding context in the
distributed system is treated as a controllable principal. CFC defines an access control
model that controls the information exchange between these principals. The access control
model has three main parts. First, an online monitoring framework is used to evaluate the
trustworthiness of context of the service applications and the underlining systems. Second,
a trust-based access control (TBAC) specification determines the permitted information
exchanges considering the active contexts of the service applications. Third, an external
communication interception runtime enforces the above specification transparently for the
entire systems. When there are multiple principals participating in the same information
flow, the same TBAC specification is applied uniformly on all principals. In this way,
we provide the protection guarantee throughout the entire information flow path, thus effi-
ciently converting the path into a trusted data path (TDP).
The most important principle guiding the design and implementation of the CFC model
is the integrity of the model itself. Since we do not trust the service applications and the
underlying systems automatically, we place the risk evaluation and associated monitoring
components of the CFC model into isolated domains, which are domains that are not sub-
ject to the same attacks or failures targeting applications and general purpose operating
systems. We have implemented a prototype of trusted data paths leveraging virtualization
technologies. The TDP software deploys online monitoring agents into privileged domains
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in platforms virtualized with the Xen hypervisor to assure the reliability of monitoring re-
sults. The TDP software also transparently intercepts communications between service
applications, at the driver level in the privileged domains. Using this technique, sensi-
tive information that is not suitable for the current context can be automatically removed,
without application involvement.
1.1 Related Work
The TDP implementation of the CFC-TBAC model integrates multiple mechanisms to en-
force data protection in potentially compromised environments. It is an access control
mechanism in that it determines what kind of information is permitted to flow to a particu-
lar context. At the same time, it treats the multiple subjects that participate in the exchange
of data as being part of the same data delivery path and enforces uniform flow controls
on the information, thus presenting similarities with the information flow control model
(IFC). The actual controls imposed are determined by dynamic risk assessments derived
from evaluations of the service applications and their underlying systems, particularly con-
sidering properties that reveal whether there exists any party that is faulty or is subject to
compromise. In this section, we explain our work in the context of access control, infor-
mation flow control, and online monitoring.
1.1.1 Access Control
In computer security, access control is the basic mechanism that guards the ways in which
data and resources are used. In any access control model, subjects represent the entities that
perform actions, and objects represent the data and resources on which the subject operates.
The access control procedure is to identify the subjects, and then grant permissions based
on the access control matrix.
Traditionally, the subjects in an access control model link only to the users that control
the software entities. Examples are the ID-based discretionary file access control in Unix
systems, and role-based access control [15, 54] in many modern distributed systems. As
4
computer systems become more complex, such simple user-based controls may not be suf-
ficiently rich to satisfy system security needs. For instance, in a peer to peer system, users
are typically anonymous which makes identity-based authentication impossible. Environ-
mental variables such as locations and times can also be important factors in determining
the proper permissions on data and resources.
There is much prior research proposing access control models that incorporate various
properties of the subjects into the access control matrix. Such models use these properties
(attributes) of subjects either alone or together with the subjects as the ‘virtual identity’
to grant permissions, thus can be characterized as attribute-based access control (ABAC)
models. The trust-based access control model in our context flow control system falls into
this category in that it uses the trustworthiness properties of the service applications and the
underling systems as the virtual identity to grant permissions. What makes our trust-based
access control model unique is what properties we collect, how we collect such properties,
how we organize these properties for easy policy specification, and how we enforce access
controls based on such properties.
Factors that might affect access control decisions range from subjects’ past behaviors
to environmental variables like location and time and many others. In open environments
like peer to peer and pervasive systems, observations of an assessed agent’s behavior range
from the satisfaction level of transactions [64, 61], to peer complaints [1], to contribu-
tions to the system [24], and to access history [22]. In various extended RBAC models,
context extensions include temporal information [4, 28], and spatial information [9], and
general environmental information [8] etc. On the one hand, our TBAC model presents
the common features of all ABAC models in that it integrates both subject behaviors and
environmental variables as the attributes of the subjects into the access control ‘model’. On
the other hand, our model is distinct in that it focuses only on those behavior and environ-
ment ‘indicators’ that reveal abnormalities. The attributes we collect are measurements of
differences between current vs. trusted application and system states.
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The ways in which to collect state information can be placed into two categories. One
uses direct observations of applications. The other uses state-collecting agents/sensors.
The trust models of open systems are typical examples of the first category. [64] acquires
the trust of one peer using observations about past transactions with this peer, and/or rec-
ommendations from others about this peer. It treats such recommendations carefully, by
considering whether it has acquired satisfactory recommendations from recommenders in
the past, and whether the recommendations match the ones from other trusted peers. The
model in [61] uses direct/indirect trust and contributions. The evaluations of direct trust
and contributions about one peer are from the observer’s direct interaction history. The
evaluations of indirect trust and contribution are calculated based on other observers’ rec-
ommendations, multiplied by the direct trust about these recommenders. In [1], peer trust-
worthiness is assessed based on the number of complaints it files and the number of com-
plaining peers. Here, a complaint is a report of cheating actions. Complaints are stored in a
distributed fashion across all nodes, for scalability and robustness purposes. The integrity
of stored complaints, however, is not apparent from the paper’s description. [24] uses debit
and credit to measure peer contributions, and derives peer-reputation accordingly. Reputa-
tion scores are stored locally, but managed by central servers and protected from tampering
by public/private-key cryptography. [22] allows systems to evaluate requesters’ trust based
on past interaction logs and recommendations from peers in its confidential community.
[8] represents another type of state collecting mechanism using context toolkits. It en-
forces authentications for components of the toolkits and ensures secure communications
among them to form secure chains for reliably collecting state.
The trust state collection mechanism in our CFC-TBAC model falls into neither cat-
egory, but is a hybrid of both. It observes application transactions and the system envi-
ronment using trusted online-monitoring agents. What makes the mechanism unique is
that these observations are not fed to the applications for access control. Instead, there are
TBAC enforcement engines that perform permission granting procedures independently
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from the data and resource providers. Access control is naturally considered as the data
and resource provider’s responsibility at the time of access, in both anonymous systems
and identity-based systems, as demonstrated in the above mentioned systems. Our model
separates this functionality from the applications running on behalf of the data and resource
providers, since we do not trust such applications automatically.
A distinguishing attribute of the CFC-TBAC model is its fine-grained control over in-
formation sharing. Traditional access control procedures like those in the models discussed
above either grant permissions for certain accesses or reject them. In contrast, the CFC-
TBAC model can provide differentiated information sharing services to contexts with dif-
ferent trust properties. For instance, it can provide different versions, e.g restricted views,
of the same data to different users based on its assessment of the risks of improper data
disclosures. The model also provides a systematical way to filter out sensitive information
based on different dimensions of trust factors.
1.1.2 Information Flow Control
The CFC-TBAC model traces the flow of shared information in a distributed system. It
uniformly applies the same TBAC specification on all principals participating in each flow.
CFC-TBAC’s goal concerning the control of information propagation is that same as that of
the traditional information flow control (IFC) model, but there are several key differences,
which are discussed in more detail below.
Information flow control (IFC) [5, 3, 10] is important to computer security. It enables
controlling the release and propagation of protected information. The decentralized in-
formation flow control (DIFC) model in [45] extends existing IFC models by allowing
individuals to declassify data they own, rather than requiring a central authority to do so.
The DIFC model uses labels on slots that hold information – values. Each label contains
an owner set and a reader sets for each owner to specify to which users owners are willing
to release the information. Information flow is valid if it happens in a restricted way, e.g.,
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by removing readers and/or adding owners. The correctness of the system depends on la-
beling slots based on well-defined security and integrity policies, and performing static and
dynamic information flow checks based on slot labels. Implementation issues like those
pertaining to the creation and location of the trusted code required for labeling, are not
discussed.
Flume [37] provides a more practical solution for DIFC on stock operating systems. It
implements DIFC at the granularity of processes, and integrates DIFC controls with stan-
dard communication abstract such as pipes, sockets, and files. Flume uses tags to describe
the nature of the protected data, and uses a set of tags termed labels to describe what a priv-
ileged process has seen or can see. Unprivileged processes are not aware of the DIFC, thus
cannot acquire any tagged information. Communications between privileged processes
can happen only when the ‘belong to’ property holds for their labels. However, Flume still
requires the distributed system to be implemented in a specific manner, e.g., splitting it
into trusted processes and untrusted processes. It also requires a trusted operating system
kernel.
DStar is another DIFC implementation, specifically targeting communications between
processes running on different machines. It controls what a machine can send out based on
what messages it receives. DStar is built on top of Flume [37] or HiStar [66]. It uses labels
on processes and on messages to control communication. All labels form a partial order set
of ‘can flow to’ relations. Trusted processes can acquire special privileges to bypass ‘can
flow to’ restrictions. Untrusted processes have labels to express their security requirements,
but have no privilege to omit any restriction.
Compared to the systems described above, the CFC-TBAC model targets the more gen-
eral set of applications that are not aware of information flow controls and that contain both
trusted and untrusted code in one domain. The model requires no application involvement
in information flow control, since applications are labelled by trust vectors based on ob-
servations made by external monitoring agents and since enforcement is also performed
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externally.
Although CFC-TBAC treats the application as a black-box, it can still trace the infor-
mation flow into and out of the application based on patterns of use or on the metadata
associated with inputs and outputs. As a result, it provides information flow control sup-
port to a much wider range of applications, but at the cost of not being able to cover all
possible information flow paths.
1.1.3 Online Monitoring
The TDP implementation of the CFC-TBAC model relies on online monitoring agents to
collect context states. The current implementation leverages existing monitoring mecha-
nisms to evaluate the trustworthiness of the applications and the underlying systems, but
we require that such mechanisms can evaluate contexts reliably and thoroughly. This is
a non-trivial assumption for multiple reasons. First, while directly inspecting state via
agents co-located with target applications and/or systems produces the most thorough re-
sults (since agents can easily access the states of the targets), agents’ lack of isolation make
it easy for malicious software to tamper with their inspection procedures and results. Con-
versely, while external network-based inspection offers excellent isolation, the information
it can collect is limited to only low level network traffic, thereby constraining the range
of attacks it can detect. New virtual machine-based inspection methods described in [21]
provide good visibility for targets, while still providing strong isolation. The TDP imple-
mentation exploits such methods, i.e., VM-based monitoring, but also uses network based
monitoring when indicated.
Regardless of which monitoring or inspection techniques are used, the TBAC model
can take into account factors that include system integrity, the presence of malicious pro-
cesses or network anomalies, unexpected application behaviors, and many others. TDP
is implemented so as to leverages existing monitoring mechanisms to gather appropriate
information and then inject it into the trust evaluation procedures used by the CFC-TBAC
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model.
To check the integrity of a guest operating system, Garfinkel [21] proposes virtual ma-
chine introspection as an approach to intrusion detection. The IDS is co-located with the
host but is isolated from it via the VMM. In [36], Kourai et al. present Hyperspector as
an inter-VM monitoring mechanism. It provides software port mirroring, inter-VM disk
mounting, and inter-VM process mapping to map server activities into the IDS VM for se-
cure intrusion detection. Petroni [51] proposes Copilot, a coprocessor-based (using a PCI
card) kernel memory monitor, to verify kernel runtime integrity through critical memory
region hashing. The work is enhanced in [52] for specification-based semantic integrity
checking.
An effective way to evaluate the security of a guest VM is to inspect what processes
are actively running. Our prototype implements a naive agent to actively collect process
creation and termination events in guest VMs, and reconstructs the process list outside
the VM using these events to check whether there is software running for purposes that
are good, such as anti-virus software, or are bad, such as rootkits and spyware. There
exist more sophisticated mechanisms for VM-based detection of stealthy processes. In
[26], Jones el al. present Antfarm to track the existence and activities of processes in
guest VMs. It monitors the low level interactions between guest operating systems and
the memory management in the VMM, such as page table operations related to virtual
address spaces. In their later work [27], they identify hidden processes using statistical
inference techniques by comparing trusted process information from Antfarm and untrusted
process information from guest VMs. Jiang el al. [25] use guest view casting to externally
reconstruct a semantically meaningful view of the guest’s VM from its raw virtual memory,
and then use comparisons between internal and external views to detect malware. Payne
el al. present the XenAccess tool [49] with which a wide variety of guest VM inspection
methods can be implemented.
Another way to detect system anomalies is through network traffic monitoring. In our
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prototype, we install hooks at the network device driver level, to obtain all necessary in-
formation related to active network connections for analysis purpose. Simple methods like
checking unexpected connections to known backdoors [57] can be easily implemented as
a context agent. One way to enhance our anomaly detection ability is to employ more
sophisticated network traffic analysis methods. For instance, in [60], Thottan et al. re-
view several methods for anomaly detection in IP networks. In [23], Gu et al. propose
to use Maximum Entropy to characterize the baseline distribution of network traffic. For
payload-based detection, NETAD [40] and LERAD [41] model application payload data
for intrusion detection. However, payload-based detection is often subject to polymorphic
blending attacks (PBAs), as shown in [18]. In later work [17], Fogla et al. present a formal
framework for PBAs and propose a technique to improve IDS against PBAs.
Evaluating specific applications’ behaviors depends on their known behavior patterns.
For simple patterns such as destination ranges of connections and folders for file saving
etc., our prototype can directly verify them based on the collected system events related to
network and file systems. For other patterns, Forrest et al. define self for privileged Unix
processes, in terms of normal patterns of short sequences of system calls, in [19]. They
show that it is simple and practical to detect several different classes of anomalies. Kalyan
[30] el al. present a method for mail pattern analysis to scan outgoing emails from financial
organizations to uncover violations of security policies. In [29], Jung et al. present Privacy
Oracle to uncover applications’ leaks of personal information in transmissions to remote
servers. It uses a differential testing technique in which perturbations in the application
inputs are mapped to perturbations in the application outputs to discover likely information
leaks.
1.2 Contributions and Limitations
The trusted data path (TDP) approach offers system support for protecting data access in
environments where systems and services are subject to failures, programming errors, and
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attacks. It presents a system-level solution for fine-grained protection on data sharing in
distributed systems. It particularly targets systems (1) that lack the extensibility to include
context factors via built-in security mechanisms, such as legacy software; (2) that are sub-
ject to attack or are suspected of faulty behaviors themselves; (3) that wish to delegate
context-based controls to external partners; and (4) that want to enforce context-based con-
trol ubiquitously instead of only at the source or sink. Applications that can benefit from
the CFC-TBAC model range from web applications like search and knowledge manage-
ment or digital content services, to healthcare information systems, to file sharing systems
using mail servers or online storage systems.
The TDP implementation operates directly on the communications between service
applications. Its independence from applications provides isolation guarantees to maintain
data protection in potentially compromised environments, and it makes it suitable for wide
range of applications. There are limitations, however, in terms of suitable target platforms
(e.g., they must be virtualized), enforcement methods that rely on their ability to manipulate
communications, the ability to properly trace information flows, and others.
1.2.1 Contributions
Leveraging the rapid evolution of virtualization technologies for modern hardware and soft-
ware platforms [2, 38, 44], the trusted data path approach develops methods and software
infrastructure to better control how data is accessed and used in distributed systems. The
approach enhances underlying platforms to create and maintain trusted data paths for data
shared across interacting services and machines. A rigorous context flow control model is
used to control all communications, i.e., data sharing, among service applications on TDPs.
The CFC-TBAC model, and the TDP implementation make the following contributions:
• Trust-based, dynamic access control. The CFC model adjusts data sharing in re-
sponse to dynamically observed changes in service behaviors and/or in the properties
of shared hardware or systems. Specifically, it enforces trust-based access control on
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data flows to the services and platforms on TDPs. Trust is defined as the information
provider’s level of satisfaction about information safety, and it consists of scored rat-
ings in multiple dimensions, i.e., trust vectors. This permits the CFC to base access
control actions on factors such as whether the request is from an audited program,
whether the system has anti-virus software running, and whether the request is from
a reasonable environment like an office vs. a mobile machine. Further, there is flexi-
bility in how trust values are determined from application behaviors and system con-
texts, and also in how trust values are mapped to access controls. Both are captured
by policies associated with TDPs.
• Trusted control agents isolated from applications. TDP software places TBAC en-
gines into privileged domains provided by the virtual machine monitor (VMM). This
ensures that its checks and controls are not subject to the failures and attacks expe-
rienced by commodity operating systems and open applications. Our current imple-
mentation relies on the integrity of the VMM and its privileged domains.
• External control. Trusted data path implements message interception and manip-
ulation transparently to and separately from the execution and implementation of
applications running in guest VMs. This is done by intercepting the network traffic
of guest VMs at the backend drivers in the driver domain, redirecting traffic to in-
terception runtimes, and then reinserting processed results back into the normal data
stream. This means that trusted data path can protect data exchanges between appli-
cations that do not have such functionality themselves, perhaps because they were
not designed to do so (e.g., for legacy services) or because they were written to op-
erate in some specific environment (e.g., within a single trust domain) but must now
function in contexts where trust levels vary dynamically (e.g., when virtual machines
migrate across physical platforms).
• Flexible filtering. The TBAC model offers permissions that are more flexible than
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simple grant-or-reject actions. The permissions associated with the protected infor-
mation are represented by restriction filters that filter out information not suitable for
the recipients’ contexts. The TBAC specification describes the relationship between
different filters and various trust properties of the recipients, e.g., trust vectors, and
the TBAC engine combines necessary filters based on the TBAC specifications to
produce the restricted views suitable for the recipients’ contexts.
• End-to-end operation. Access controls are associated with all participants of a trusted
data exchange. Toward this end, TBAC engines running on different platforms coop-
erate with each other to enforce access control for all entities involved in a distributed
data exchange. This is done by propagating access policy-related information to-
gether with the data being exchanged. As a result, access control enforcement is
ubiquitous, extending across the entire data delivery path, hence the term trusted
data path.
1.2.2 Limitations
The basic assumption, or rather requirement, of the TDP implementation is that there exist
trusted places that can monitor service nodes and client nodes, and then perform trust-based
access control operations. Our current implementation utilizes virtualization technologies
for that purpose, by placing TDP functionality into the control domain (Domain 0) of the
Xen hypervisor [2]. We believe this assumption to be acceptable given the increased use of
virtualization in modern computer systems and the ever-increasing computational capabil-
ities of future multicore platforms.
A key feature of trusted data paths is the ability to transparently and dynamically filter
the data being shared. This requires that TBAC filters have knowledge about the semantics
of ongoing communications. Moreover, this works only as long as such changes are accept-
able to applications and to the communication protocols they use. This will not be the case
for all application and protocols, of course. Additionally, we assume cooperative behaviors
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from servers or clients if there is encryption involved in the communication protocol, such
as the use of SSL/TLS [11]. When TDP encounters unexpected encrypted traffic that it
cannot handle, it has to resort to the security policy to either ignore the traffic or downgrade
the trust level of the parties involved.
TDP does not target applications like those in distributed finance or banking that depend
on complete and correct information sharing. It also cannot be used to maintain strong
data security, because (1) trust-based assessments may fail to recognize certain attacks
or failures, so that data may be supplied to untrustworthy participants, (2) once data has
been released, TDP controls cannot detect all of the ways in which data may be shared
or acquired by malicious end users, and (3) TDP can only base access controls on the
available context information, thus can only work as a supplement to existing access control
mechanisms (e.g., role-based, capability-based, etc).
Compared to strict information flow control [10, 5, 3, 45, 66, 37, 67] offering systematic
ways to identify an information flow using labels and tags, the CFC model lacks the mech-
anism to accurately trace each information flow. This is due to the way it operates, where
the approach treats the application as a black-box. This means that it cannot match all of
the inputs and outputs of an application due to reasons like data obfuscation. Since the ap-
plications we discuss here operate as black boxes, their outputs might be tainted by any of
the inputs, which makes strict IFC not possible. Instead, we trace information flows based
on the patterns of or the metadata associated with inputs and outputs. Finally, since we
cannot monitor data manipulation and obfuscation inside the application, the CFC model
cannot cover all possible information flows as in strict IFC.
> > >
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we give motivated
examples and describe the CFC-TBAC model. In chapter 3, we then illustrate how TBAC
engines monitor application and system behaviors using context agents. In chapter 4, we
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introduce how we integrate TBAC into communication among applications of a distributed
system. And finally we show how to apply the CFC-TBAC model on real systems, and how





The ability to share sensitive information is a key necessity for today’s distributed appli-
cations. It is essential to provide access control to match security and privacy policies
regarding such information. Existing solutions addressing the access control requirements
typically require the data provider to evaluate the recipients’ identities, roles, and/or capa-
bilities owned, as well as their behaviors [1, 22, 24, 61, 64] and the surrounding context
[4, 8, 9, 28] of applications running on behalf of the recipients. The context flow control
(CFC) approach presented in this thesis adopts another way to deal with factors about ap-
plication behaviors and surrounding context: 1) it moves the evaluation of such factors and
the associated access control procedures into trusted places by leveraging virtualization
technologies, 2) it works transparently and invisibly to the data provider and the recipi-
ent applications by enforcing additional context-based access restrictions directly on data
objects in communication,
We will begin this chapter with two examples that demonstrate the usefulness of the
CFC approach. Next, we explain that how we define the restrictions on basic data objects
shared between applications in the distributed systems. We illustrate how we extend the
access control using a trust-based access control (TBAC) model to cover the context infor-
mation and how we evaluate those context information trustworthily. And last, we show
how CFC constructs trusted data paths (TDPs) to offer end-to-end data protection.
2.1 Motivating Examples
This section describes two classes of applications able to benefit from the CFC approach
and implementation. One is in the realm of healthcare information systems, and the other




































Figure 1: Health Care Information System.
trusted data paths can provide both (1) trust-based dynamic access control on information
release, and (2) ubiquitous controls on information propagation, to match desired security
and privacy policies. Both applications impose different demands on the sharing of sensi-
tive information, thereby demonstrating the range of checks and controls supported by the
CFC approach.
In the figures, ovals represent the services and client applications running on behalf of
certain organizations or end users. These are the basic entities that own/generate, request/-
consume, and propagate information. The double ovals represent the services that perform
access controls on released information. The services and client applications rely on the
underling system for supportive functionalities, present certain behavior patterns, and exe-
cute on behalf of certain principals in variable contexts. All of the properties tightly related
to information access are summarized as ‘context information’, illustrated in the figures as
rectangles next to the corresponding services and applications.
The elements in parentheses — ( I:si; T:st ) represent the information being exchanged
between services and applications. Semicolons separate different fields of the information
into different elements, such as I:si for identification information and T:st for treatment
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information in a patient record. Uppercase characters represent the portion of the data orig-
inally granted to requesters by the existing access control model, and lowercase characters
indicate the need to apply certain restrictions to the data before it is released to the recipient.
These restrictions correspond to the context information shown in the rectangles.
Characterizing the communication channels between services and applications, their
properties are listed in brackets as meta-information associated with each channel. Such
information describes (1) the purpose of the communication channel, (2) certain properties
of the entities linked by the channel, (3) the kind of data on the channel, etc. In general,
meta-information concerns the properties of the information in a channel’s messages, rep-
resented by Mdata.
2.1.1 Healthcare Information System
With the increased use of electronic medical records, healthcare information systems (HISs)
must address challenges concerning data privacy and security. Privacy requirements, for in-
stance, are described in HIPAA [63] and in Directive 95/46/EC [14] in the U.S. and Europe.
Since such regulations are formulated using natural languages and can be interpreted de-
pending on the ever-changing environment, security procedures adopted in the healthcare
information system of organizations like hospitals should be flexible to address emerging
threats.
As a concrete example, consider the Care2X open-source healthcare information sys-
tem [6]. Figure 1 illustrates a deployment of Care2X in a hospital. The core of the system
is a web server working as the front-end interface. End users like doctors, nurses, staff and
patients access the system using client side browsers. The Web server communicates with
the backend database server to access patient records.
The Care2X system adopts a simple role-based access control model. Patients’ health-
care information is categorized based the source of the information, such as nursing stations
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and radiology, etc., and based on categories like laboratory test requests and results. Reg-
istered users acquire access rights for each category based their roles. However, the model
does not address users’ current contexts. For instance, we might expect doctors to get dif-
ferent views (I:li; T:lt) of the same patient records when their access locations l change.
One example is the case in which a doctor discusses the treatment of his patient in another
doctor’s office. For such a context, the system can place a strict restriction li on part of
the patient identification information (I) and make only the related treatment information
available.
There are other reasons than context for changing data access protection for patient
records. Certain system or application behaviors may affect desired protection. For exam-
ple, systems with uptodate security patches should have access privileges that are stronger
than those that are not well-defended. Further, when an end user does not use the expected
agent application to access the patient record system, this gives rise to concerns about the
safety of the information released to and the integrity of the information received from this





t in which an end user operates.
2.1.2 Cooperative Data Sharing
A second class of examples driving our research concerns the extensive and cooperative
sharing of data in today’s highly networked society. Using Facebook and other social
networking sites, people share data with their relatives, friends, and colleagues. The tacit
assumption being made is that the data being shared flows only to those parties for which it
is intended. Consider, for instance, someone updating his private photos in his online photo
gallery to which he has granted access permission for his friends. A friend can access the
photos on a private computer at home, or on public ones in say, an Internet Cafe or a
library. In the second case, however, the machine’s browser cache might leak the photos to





























Figure 2: Network-based Data Sharing Example.
are few ways to prevent her from doing so except for the associated moral liability. Similar
scenarios exist when sharing critical documents. For example, when an unpublished paper
is sent to reviewers, the propagation of the paper should be accessed only by the small
group of reviewers, except for its abstract and title.
As stated in the introduction, it is difficult to fully control information propagation
in today’s loosely coupled service networks. The purpose of our work is to strengthen
such controls, on the basis of a common and trusted software platform. Such a platform
should evaluate participating system and service behaviors, and it can then apply additional
mechanisms to ubiquitously enforce data access policies throughout the information flow
path. Information flows leaving the trusted set of platforms can be restricted in accordance
with application-specific protection policies. The next paragraph further clarifies this.
In an ideal discrete access control model, a data owner can specify the desired access
policy on information even after it has been released. Figure 2 represents such a policy as
abstract meta-information Mdata. In a server-based data sharing model, as shown in the left
part of the figure, two servers may have different abilities to handle such meta-information.
Well-equipped servers may strictly enforce the policy embedded in meta-information, as
done in our previous work described in VStore [55] and even propagate the policy along
with the data to the next node. A general-purpose server may not be able to do so. The
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TDP approach to data protection describes such capabilities as ‘server contexts’, and the
TDP software reacts to context differences by imposing the different restrictions a and b on
the data seen by servers.
Continuing the example above, further along the path, the browser context c indicates
whether information released to the browser is still under control. The context might in-
clude but is not limited to whether the browser understands Mdata, whether Mdata is still
bound to the data when the browser sends it to storage or another email agent, whether the
stored data is accessible by untrusted applications, etc. The paths from the data owner to
the server, then to the browser, the storage, the email client, the mail server, and the email
recipient constitute trusted data paths. The CFC model associates TBAC engines with each
part of these paths to retain control over the data.
2.2 Context-Based Access Restriction
Consider a service-based distributed system offering a built-in security and privacy model
that provides access controls on some object set D. Such data objects typically contain
‘rich’ information for recipients, where the term ‘rich’ implies that the system can continue
to function even if it only receives partial object information. For instance, in the Care2X
HIS system, basic objects are the web pages sent to client browsers. Each such page con-
sists of one or multiple elements, such as patient identification information, doctor notes,
prescriptions, daily charts of blood pressures, and billing information, etc. Objects can
be displayed and manipulated even when certain information is missing, such as a patient
name not visible to nurses not on station. With the CFC, restrictions on data exchanges that
hide critical information can depend not only on static identities, but also on the current
roles of users, the times and locations of access, and similar contextual factors, as stated
more precisely next.
The idea of the CFC and the TDP implementation realizing it is that information shar-
ing should strike a balance between data safety and application functionalities, by placing
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context-based access restrictions on data beyond those imposed by application-level con-
trols. The CFC-TBAC model provides a systematic way of defining those restrictions for
data recipients. More precisely, we use the CFC to determine a ‘restricted view’ of the
object, thereby reducing its information content. The origin of a restricted view could be
any member of an object group of the object set D. This means that a restricted view is
equivalent to a subset of the object set D. Therefore, we can formally define an access
restriction as a function f : D→ 2D.
An access restriction f must satisfy two properties. First, it is obvious that an object
must be one of the potential origins of its restricted view. Second, an access restriction
should not create ambiguity. In other words, if a restricted view has a potential origin object
d, then it must be equal to a restricted view of d. Formally, then, an access restriction can
be defined as stated below.
Definition 1. For object set D, access restriction is a function f : D→ 2D, where
∀d ∈ D, d ∈ f (d), and ∀D
′
∈ f (D): if d ∈ D′ , then f (d) = D
′
.
we can easily prove that its function image f (D) is a group of disjoint subsets of D. If
two subsets have at least one common element d, the restricted view of d should be equal
to both subsets. Thus access restriction can also be described as follows.
Theorem 1. For object space D, access restriction function f is equivalent to a group of
subsets Di ⊆ D, 0 < i ≤ n, where ∪0<i≤nDi = D, and ∀0 < i < j ≤ n : Di ∩ D j = ∅, and
∀d ∈ Di : f (d) = Di.
The formal model above captures the general principle of data reduction or filtering
for objects. An implementation rule associated with such filtering assumed by the CFC
model is that only those restricted views are permitted that are understood and accepted by
the system and application. Stated intuitively, the view should be in the same form as the
original object. Stated formally, f (d) should be represented by an object d
′
in the object
set D or a slightly extended set D∗ (without loss generality, we use D as the extended set
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hereafter). This is equivalent to saying that some objects in D are polymorphic. The system
can treat such an object as either a single object or a potential object set if necessary. For
instance, a blank field in a patient record means either there is no input or that the field is
filtered out. So, when implemented in a system, the access restriction f can be in the form
of a filter function f∗ : D→ D.
One interesting point is that the same access restriction can be implemented in differ-
ent filters depending on the selection of the representative objects. For example, for an
object set {(a, b)|a, b ∈ N}, the access restriction based on filters f1((a, b)) = (a + b, 0) and
f2((a, b)) = (0, a + b) are identical. Both (x, 0) and (0, x) are representatives of the same set
{(a, b)|a + b = x}.
Sometimes different context factors call for different restrictions on information release.
This can be modeled as different access restriction filters applied to the same object set D.
Using a digital image as an example, it may be desirable to perform both resolution down-
scaling and image greyscaling. The composition of the combined two restrictions filter out
more information from the object than either one of them. To formalize the composability
of access restrictions, we define a partial order  in definition 2 below. In plain text, the
statement g  f means g is less certain when tracing back to the original objects from the
partial view. We define the composition of two access restrictions as their greatest lower
bound, as in definition 3 below.
Definition 2. For two access restrictions f with image {D′i, 0 < i ≤ m} and g with image
{D′′j , 0 < j ≤ n}, g  f if and only if ∀ D
′′





Theorem 2. For two access restriction functions defined as f , g : D→ 2D,
g  f ⇔ ∀d ∈ D : f (d) ⊆ g(d)
Definition 3. For two access restrictions f and g in poset (F ,), the composition of f and
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g is their greatest lower bound. Formally:
c = f ◦ g ⇔

c  f , c  g, and
∀k  f , k  g : k  c
For two access restrictions represented by filters f , g : D → D, their composition
is not always equivalent to the function composition of the two filters. This is because
the filters use one object to represent a mapped subset of access restrictions, thus losing
a certain degree of generality. For example, for access restrictions represented by filters
‘ f (n) = 4 ∗ (n/4)’ and ‘g(n) = 5 ∗ (n/5)’, the access restriction composition is represented
by ‘k(n) = 20 ∗ (n/20)’ and does not equal to either g( f (n)) or f (g(n)) obviously. Based
on theorem 2, we have the relation of f ◦ g  g, but not necessarily f ◦ g  f , However,
if the composition of filters f , g is commutable, we can easily prove that the filter function
composition indeed represents the composition of restrictions as theorem 3.
Theorem 3. For two access restriction procedures f, g : D → D where f(g(d)) = g(f(d)),
the composition of procedures f · g corresponds to access restriction composition, and it is
represented by set of subsets of 2D :
{Di | Di ⊆ D; and
∀ d1, d2 ∈ Di : g(f(d1)) = g(f(d2)) ∈ Di; and
∀ d1 ∈ Di, d2 ∈ D̄i : g(f(d1)) , g(f(d2))}
Specifically, if an object set D has multiple dimensions, e.g., D = X ×Y where × is the
Cartesian product, then the composition of two filters f on X and g on Y is commutable
and thus, it represents the composed restrictions on two dimensions.
f
′
(x, y) = (f(x), y); g
′
(x, y) = (x, g(y));





There are some restriction filters that are not commutable, thus cannot guarantee the
validity of the composition. For instances, consider the following two filters:
f(5m + i) = 5m + 4, ∀m ∈ N, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
g(4n + j) = 4n, ∀n ∈ N, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
For statement “g(x) = 8”, we can deduct that the possible set of x is {8, 9, 10, 11}. If
for “g · f(x) = 8”, then the possible set of x is only {8, 9}. However, for most of the
procedures that are meaningful for the CFC, they are usually ones that remove certain
subfields of objects. It is easy to verify that such procedures are usually idempotent and
commutable when composed together. In this thesis, we focus only on filters that guarantee
commutable compositions. There are some restriction filters that are not commutable. Our
framework can include such filters, but correctness cannot be guaranteed formally when
they are combined with other filters.
2.3 Trust-based Access Control
In the previous section, we describe the access restrictions that produce partial view of
objects for different contexts. In this section, we introduce the trust-based access control
(TBAC) model supplementing existing application-level access controls, by evaluating the
surrounding trust-related context of a running process, and for all messages delivered to (or
from) this process, applying proper access restrictions.
2.3.1 TBAC Model
The implementation of trusted data paths operates on communications among running pro-
cesses. Thus, the objects on which it operates are messages on network connections. In
the TBAC model, the Subjects to which the model grants permissions on messages are
the surrounding Contexts of message recipients, thus the term Context Flow Control. We
use access control lists (ACLs) instead of capabilities, and we try to categorize messages
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based on the types of information they contain, and then link the ACLs based on the data
types contained in messages. Therefore, an ACL entry determines the permissions on the
associated data type granted to a certain context.
Considering the complexity of today’s computer systems, there exist many trust-related
factors, including but not limited to access location, access time, device installed, and soft-
ware behavior patterns, etc. It is unrealistic, therefore, to include all such factors in an ACL.
Moreover, as computer system evolves, new threats occur, which might make an ACL too
dynamic to manage. In response and enlightened by the role-based access control model
(RBAC) [15, 16], we introduce the concept of ‘trust vector’ as the intermediate between
contexts and permissions, hence the term trust-based access control (TBAC). The use of
trust vectors limits the complexity of the ACL to the cardinality of the trust vector set.
The CFC defines trust as the information provider’s level of satisfaction about informa-
tion safety. A trust vector is the evaluation of the surrounding context in various aspects
represented in certain scales, and it consists of scored ratings in multiple dimensions. For
example, a trust vector can be in the form of {“ Reasonableness of Access”, “ System Secu-
rity Level”}. Accessing a patient’s record at home by a doctor might not be that reasonable,
though it is still better than accessing it from a public library, for example. This permits the
CFC to base access control actions on factors such as whether the request is from an audited
program, whether the system has anti-virus software running, and whether the request is
from a reasonable environment like an office vs. a mobile machine.
For each trust vector, the permissions on messages are in the form of access restrictions.
Under the assumption that each dimension of a trust vector is independent, we associate
restriction filters separately on each dimension. We then use function composition to form
the final restriction filters that can produce the correct views of messages to the authorized
recipients.
We next summarize the above description into the TBAC specification.
• CT XS , set of all possible active context.
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TVECS = TVEC1 × ... × TVECn, set of possible trust vectors
FLTS , set of restriction filters.
OBJS , set of categories of message data.
• trust_evaluation : CT XS → TVECS — (trust_evaluationi : CT XS → TVECi)
the active context to trust vector mapping.
• RES TRS = 2(FLTS×OBJS ), the set of restrictions that are defined by restrictions on
categories of message data.
• RA ⊆ RES TRS × TVECS — (RAi ⊆ RES TRS × TVECi)
a many-to-many mapping that indicate the restrictions associated with certain trust
vector.
• restriction_applied : TVEC → RES TRS , the mapping that determines the maxi-
mum restrictions applied on a trust vector. Formally:
restriction_appliedi (tveci) = {
⋃




• permission : (OBJS × RES TRS ) → FLTS , the mapping that converts restrictions
into real permission on one specific message category. Formally:
permission (ob j, restr) = ◦ d : d ∈ FLTS , (d, ob j) ∈ restr.
2.3.2 TBAC Policy
Having specified the basic TBAC model, we now show how to specify desired data protec-
tion using the TBAC model. This specification starts from understanding what restrictions
can be applied on the data objects. It associates the restrictions with the evaluation of po-
tential risks of information misuse in the surrounding contexts, with risks represented as
trust vectors. The specification formalizes the context evaluation from ‘totally untrusted’
to ‘fully trusted’ with a partial ordered trust vector set. It then links active contexts to trust
vectors, as well as trust vectors to restriction filters.
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Table 1: Restriction on Personal Identifiers
Field Group Op Names Filters
Critical none; f ull (c = remove_critical_id); 1
General none; f ull (g = remove_general_id); 1
Hospitalization none; f ull (h = remove_hosp_id); 1
Identi f ier none; hosp; gen; f ull (c · g · h); (c · g); c; 1
Table 2: Translation of Trust-vector to Restriction
Reasonableness Critical General Hospitalization Identifier
High f ull f ull f ull f ull
Medium none f ull f ull gen
Low none none f ull hosp
NOT none none none none
The basic unit of data controlled by the TBAC model is the message exchanged between
running processes. Restricted messages should be in the same format as the original mes-
sages. We assume that messages contain field groups that are independent, so that we can
define restriction filters on each of them and then compose them. We implement restriction
filters in ways that remove protected fields, so the composition of filters are commutable.
Table 1 shows the set of restriction filters that operate on the personal identifiers in the
HTML page of the Care2X HIS. For one specific data field group, there are multiple avail-
able restrictions with distinct names. Each name is associated with a restriction filter (1
represents the identity function). We can define three field groups for the personal identi-
fier, separately for critical data like social security number, general data like address, and
hospitalization related data like the patient-id. Alternatively, we can define one group just
as ‘Identifier’ and then define multiple named restrictions on it.
Table 2 defines the relation of trust vectors with the above restrictions for one specific
trust aspect – reasonableness. The table lists all possible values for one specific dimension
of the trust vector. Each value then links to the restriction filters in Table 1 by the filed
group name and the restriction name in the table. It shows that different field groups have




















{E is trusted; TBAC=on
  C1.dom0.trust=1}Root {C2.dom0.trust=0}Root
TBAC
Engine
Service S Client C2
C1.kernel
C1.user
Figure 3: Context Evaluation by TBAC Engine.
the most protection. The mapping between restrictions and trust vectors should follow the
natural meaning of trust vectors – less trust means more restrictions. A formal verification
of such relations would be based on the partial order of the trust vectors and the restrictions.
The mapping of trust vectors to active contexts depends on how to translate the abstract
description of information misuse risks to realistic system and application properties. In
our model, such a mapping should be a formula that includes inputs from various online
monitoring agents.
2.3.3 TBAC Policy Engine
The TBAC policy engine operates on application messages according to some predefined
logic defined as policies. Since the correctness of the engine’s behavior depends on the
trustworthiness of its surrounding context, it makes no sense to apply TBAC if we cannot
guarantee the integrity of the input context information or the safety of the environment in
which the engine runs.
Figure 3 illustrates how the TBAC policy engine collects context information and op-
erates in a trusted fashion. The engine assumes that the lower layer of a system is more
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trusted than its upper layer, as well as the existence of a fully trusted management server
working as the root-of-trust. As seen in the figure, the client C1 runs in a guest domain
of a para-virtualized system. There are multiple context agents running in user space, ker-
nel space, and in the control domain. They collect the systems’ and applications’ context
information as inputs to the TBAC engine.
A context agent always signs its own statements. It can make statements about the trust-
worthiness of other context agents based on Rule 1. To assure the integrity of statements,
the engine adopts transitivity rule 2 concerning the usage of the statement. As shown in
Figure 3, statements from {A, B,C, E} are valid for use by the TBAC engine, while the ones
from D are not.
Rule 1. A context agent can make statements about its own layer and upper layers.
Rule 2. A context statement is valid to use in layer X if it is signed directly or transitively
by a context agent from layer X or lower or by the root-of-trust.
TBAC engines run in contexts that are certified by the root-of-trust. In Figure 3, for a
message from the service S to the client C1, the TBAC engine on the node S can acquire
context statements about C1 certified by the root-of-trust server, and performs the proper
trust-based access control, or it can delay the check to the engine on the node C1. For mes-
sages to the client C2, the TBAC engine on S must perform the check with only statements
about C2 from the root, since there is no TBAC engine on C2.
2.4 Context Flow Control
We have specified how the TBAC engine collects context information and determines the
current trust level and the associated restriction filters. We now describe the CFC model
that uses TBAC to construct TDPs for existing service systems. The CFC model assumes
that the service system consists of multiple communication channels that cooperatively
deliver sensitive information from some source to some set of end users. These channels
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Figure 4: Flow Control on Trust-Data-Path Node.
The setup of TDPs starts by identifying the nodes that may serve as sources of sen-
sitive information. From the source nodes, it traces the connections that carry the data
to intermediate nodes and from intermediate nodes to end nodes. All these connections
form a directed data delivery graph. The CFC model specifies interception rules to identify
whether a connection belongs to the graph, what kind of data (e.g., the meta-information)
is in the connection, and what TBAC specification applies. Thus, the entire data delivery
graph is under control of the CFC, thereby forming a trusted data path.
Figure 4 shows a single service node that serves as both the sink and source of some
sensitive information. We can view the node as a function unit with certain communication
interfaces such as listening ports. A channel is automatically put under control of the
TBAC session manager if it is part of a trusted data path identified by the interception rules.
When a message comes in through the channel, the session manager first determines the
meta-information Mdata of the message. Mdata is from either the cooperating applications
or from the message itself, like customized HTML tags or MIME headers. The TBAC
engine collects trust-related statements from the context agents and determines the current
trust vector. It then calculates appropriate restrictions based on the policy specification
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and acquires the final permission – a composition of restriction filters. Such filters are
applied via on-the-fly message manipulation, using hooks at the device driver level. With
such hooks, a message on a socket connection is redirected to a special process, termed
the interception runtime. The TBAC engine applies the restrictions on data in that runtime,
and it then pushes the result back into the connection. In this fashion, a restricted version
of the message is delivered to the recipient, without its involvement and transparent to
communicating parties.
The CFC model relies on properly maintained meta-information Mdata to retain control
over data, and Mdata should always travel along with the sensitive data on TDPs. The CFC
model supports propagation control by dynamically evaluating recipient nodes for whether
or not they are able to maintain Mdata of shared information concerning future propagation.
Only for those with such abilities, the TBAC engine will green-light the information deliv-
ered to them. The trust vector in this case should include one or more dimensions about
propagation control abilities. Examples of relevant context information include but are not
limited to (1) whether the node has the ability to attach the meta-information Mdata when
relaying data to the next recipient, (2) whether the data is stored insecurely thus allowing
access from uncontrolled applications, or (3) whether the node serves as a recipient-only
without ‘save/print’ functions.
2.5 Others
The TBAC model delivers different versions of the same object to recipients with differ-
ent surrounding contexts. The same technique has been used before for performance and
protection purposes in various research works. In [59], Takagi et al. develop a system
to transcode already-existing Web pages to be accessible using simplification or full-text
transcoding modes. Knutsson et al. [32] show how server-directed transcoding can be in-
tegrated into the HTTP protocol and into the implementation of a proxy. In [65], Widener
et al. present a mechanism for providing differential data protection to publish/subscribe
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distributed systems using derived channels in ECho [13]. CameraCast project [33] imple-
ments logical device drivers for remote video sensors to provide differential views for users
based on their capabilities.
There are services or client applications running on traditional non-virtualized platform.
We have implemented protected data path [35] in linux based systems. It assumes that
system kernels are safe and performs protection related work there. If the root-of-trust
server can certify the trustworthiness of the kernel of a regular operating system, we can
then trust the context information collected by agents running in the kernel, and even deploy




The context flow control (CFC) approach intends to prevent inappropriate data sharing and
access in distributed systems. It focuses on applications that are subject to failures, pro-
gramming errors and attacks. Access rights of applications to data should not only depend
on their functional characteristics, but also on their as well as the underlying systems’ be-
haviors. The CFC-TBAC mode and the trusted data path (TDP) implementation adjust data
sharing in response to dynamically observed changes in application behaviors and/or in the
properties of underlying systems or hardware.
We design the context evaluation part to meet the following goals for supporting TDPs.
First, the agents that collect context information should not be subject to compromised
systems or faulty applications. Second, the model should be extensible to support new
context agents to address emerging threats and new policies etc.
In this chapter, we introduce the light-weight event middleware that provides a unified
interface to context agents and other parts of the TDP implementation. Next we describe
how context agents collect systems and applications’ behavior characteristics information,
and how to guarantee the integrity of the collected information. Then we give examples of
context agents in different categories.
3.1 Context Evaluation Framework
The TDP implementation consists of multiple functional components such as the context
evaluation, session management, TBAC enforcement etc. Context evaluation is imple-
mented by various standalone utilities, termed as context agents, that collect different sys-
tems and applications’ behavior characteristics. We design a light-weight event delivery
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Figure 5: TEvent Framework
Table 3: TEvent API
API Name Description
event_register_member register unit as a member of TEvent.
event_unregister_member register a member.
event_invoke_member create an instance of specific member.
event_release_member release an instance of specific member.
event_send read events target to the specified member
event_receive write events to targeted members
middleware to accommodate various TDP components into one framework. All compo-
nents of the TDP implementation talk with each other through the unified event interface.
3.1.1 TEvent Framework and Interface
Figure 5 illustrates a light-weight event delivery middleware, termed as TEvent. The man-
agement layer crosses the entire distributed system deploying TDP components as config-
ured. The deployment step is further discussed in chapter 5. Here we keep focus on context
agents. Each context agent acquires a unique identifier recognized as the combination of
node, domain, and index specifications. An event layer routes events (messages) among
different agents based on the identifiers. The event layer utilizes either a socket based inter-
node communication layer, or a shared memory based inter-VM communication layer to
transmit events.




int dest_node , dest_domain , dest_index;




// event_code -dependent structures.
}u;
};
Figure 6: Basic Structure of TEvent Messages
functional components — usually standalone processes such as context agents, own distinct
service names. Different service names represent different functionalities. A context agent
calls event_register_member with its service name to register itself as a local member of
the TEvent. Inside of the TEvent on each node, it maintains a table to map service names to
internal identifiers shown in figure 5. Context agents talk with each other as well as other
TDP components based on service names. To send events to another member of the TEvent,
a context agent calls event_invoke_member to acquire the target’s internal identifier, and
then sends/receives events by the identifier.
Figure 6 shows the structure of a TEvent event. The event_code field indicates the type
of the event. The dest_... and orig_... specify the internal identifiers of the source and desti-
nation of a message. Various flag bits in event_ f lags indicate the requirements on message
delivery and the expected responses from the target. A member can use event_send and
event_receive to send and receive events in either blocking or non-blocking manners.
3.1.2 TEvent Implementation
Our prototype of the TDP implementation is based on the Xen [2] para-virtualization plat-
form. Applications run in guest VMs. Context agents reside in either the same guest VMs
as the applications, or in the control domain (Dom0) isolated from the guest VMs.

























Figure 7: Event Flow inTEvent
event layer through a unified interface. The event layer maintains events from local context
agents in a FIFO queue. An event dispatcher picks events from the queue and routes them
based on destinations. Events that cross domains on the same node are exchanged between
the guest backend and frontend. Events to remote nodes are routed to a communication
agent in the control domain, then to communication agent peers on destination nodes.
The event layer interface and dispatcher are implemented as kernel modules, named
as TEvtCore. The module maintains a table of active local members. Each entry of the
table records one member’s service name, internal identifier, owner process, and a small
block of buffer for pending events. It also maintains hash tables for quick lookup based on
service names or internal identifiers. The module registers a pseudo file system and creates
one inode for each member, thus it can map the internal identifiers to file descriptors. The
API calls of event_send, event_receive and event_unregister_member are then mapped to
general system calls of read, write and close.
To send an event to a context agent, the caller need to lock up (e.g. increase refer-
ence count of) the target agent using event_invoke_member. For a local context agent, the
TEvtCore does a hash table lookup by the service name. If there is no hit, the TEvtCore
will contact the TDP management layer to deploy a function unit with the specified service
name. The newly deployed unit registers itself so the lookup will success. Then the TEvt-
Core sends a control event EVT_CTRL_INVOKE to the agent on behalf of the caller. The
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agent creates necessary data structures and claims that it is ready for processing incoming
events from the caller. Optionally, the agent can spawn a child member of the TEvent for
each caller, so the agent can handle events from different callers separately. Locking up a
remote context agent works slightly different. Two TEvtCore modules talk with each other
by control events EVT_CTRL_INVOKE and EVT_CTRL_INVOKE_DONE to lock up agents re-
motely. Unlocking a context agent (e.g. decreases its reference count) works similarly
using the EVT_CTRL_RELEASE control event.
Events from event_send are put into a FIFO queue. An event dispatcher, which is a
dedicated kernel thread, wakes up on new events and picks events from the head of the
queue. If the destination of an event is a local context agent member, the dispatcher puts
the event into the buffer specified by the member’s table entry. The context agent reads
in the event using event_receive call later. If the destination is another node or another
VM on the same node, it puts the event into queues of the communication layer which is
implemented as two special members described in the next section. The maximum size of
the FIFO queue in our current prototype is four megabytes. Although it is more than enough
for us to maintain events in the system without overflow, we implement a ‘drop-the-oldest’
policy and utilize time-out mechanisms to avoid infinite waiting on certain dropped events.
3.1.3 Communication Layer
For each TEvtCore in the control domain, there are two special members – a communi-
cation agent for inter-node communication and a communication guest backend for inter-
VM communication, working as the communication layer of the TEvent middleware. The
TDP management layer deploys the TEvtCore module, the communication agent, and the
communication guest backend. Communication agents know each other through the man-
agement layer. Each communication agent owns its digital certificate. Any two commu-
nication agents can establish secure connections (SSL over TCP) using the certificates. A
communication guest backend knows its counter-parts — communication guest frontends
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Figure 8: I/O descriptor ring of Xen (image copied from [2]).
in guest VMs by monitoring the creation of new VMs. They communicate through the
shared-memory based Xen-Bus.
As a member of the TEvtCore, the communication agent has its own queue for pending
events. The event dispatcher puts events for remote member in this queue. The agent reads
in an event from the queue, checks the destination, and looks for the communication agent
on the destination node. The event is then routed to the remote communication agent, and
then to the destination through the remote TEvtCore.
The communication guest backend and frontend utilize Xen’s I/O transfer mechanism
to support event transfer between the Dom0 and guest VMs. We borrow a figure from [2]
as shown in figure 8 to illustrate how Xen’s I/O descriptor ring works. It is a circular queue
of descriptors in a shared page between a guest VM and the Dom0. The communication
guest frontend and backend are kernel modules in the guest VM and the Dom0 separately.
The frontend allocates two ring buffers and grants access to the the guest backend. Access
to each ring is based on two pairs of producer-consumer pointers. For events from a guest
VM, the frontend places descriptors of events on a ring and advances the producer pointer.
The backend removes the descriptors for handling and advances an associated consumer
pointer. Acknowledgement of successful event handling are placed on the ring with another
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pair of pointers. Events from Dom0 to the guest VM works similarly on another ring.
3.1.4 Context Agent Communication
Context agents communicate with each other in two ways. There is a pre-defined list of
events known to all members of the TEvent. A context agent who is authorized to generate
these events can broadcast these events to all agents in the Dom0 of the same node. Agents
can define the range of events they are interested in to filter out unnecessary ones. They
also use a pair of query and answer events for direct point-to-point communication. A agent
embeds its query inside of a EVT_CTRL_QUERY event and sends it to the target agent. The



















Figure 9: Basic Structure of Queries and Answers
A context agent makes claim statements on context information using sets of attribute-
value pairs. Each attribute has a character string name. The attribute name and the agent’s
service name together determines what meaning of the value is regarding to the current
context. To query for specific context information, a caller first identifies which context
41
agent provides such information. It then invokes the agent to lock it up for the internal
identifier. Next, it composes a query event with the desired attribute name and the associ-
ated parameter as illustrated in figure 9. A query event body also contains a unique index
number to match to-be-received answers. Each query can be in one of three mode — an-
swer once, answer when value changes, or answer periodically as specified by the query
flag bits.
The corresponding answer event contains the same index to match the query. For the the
onchange and periodic modes, there are multiple answers for one query. It uses seqno in the
answer event to provide a sequential indexes for those answers. In rase cases when an an-
swer is too long to fit into one single answer event, it can set the FLAG_ANSWER_MOREPIECE
bit in flags to indicate there are more pieces of events for the same answer. The order of
multiple events of the same answer is identified by the low four bits of the flags as indicated
by FLAG_ANSWER_MULTIPIECE_MASK.
3.1.5 Integrity of Trust Agents
On a virtualized platform, there are multiple places available to run context agents to mon-
itor systems’ and applications’ behaviors. Running context agents as standard applications
in guest VMs requires least privileges. The agents depend totally on system calls to collect
information, thus have limited abilities on what information they can collect. Furthermore,
they are subject to compromised system calls. Running context agents as kernel modules
of guest operating systems brings the benefit of accessing critical system data structures
directly. With proper instrumentation, an agent knows when and how an application inter-
acts with the system and what resources it uses. However, it cannot guarantee the integrity
and the completeness of the collected information by itself. Running context agents in a
privileged domain provides the best isolation enforced by the VMM. However, the abil-
ity to access guest VMs is limited. Tools like XenAccess [49] are able to monitor guest
VMs’ memory and disk operations, but there are certain active information such as process
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creation and termination that cannot be captured by passive monitoring mechanisms.
In our prototype, we implement hybrid deployment of context agents and utilize the
chain of trust rule in section 2.3.3. Context agents themselves are certified before it can be
deployed into TDPs. With the assumption of a trusted Dom0, we then assure that informa-
tion from context agents in the Dom0 is reliable to use. For the purpose of collecting some
systems’ and applications’ behavior information, we deploy a context agent in each guest
VM as a kernel module. It acts on basic system behaviors such as process creation and
termination, file operations, socket connection establishment etc. The integrity of the col-
lected information have to be certified from outside of the guest domain since it is subject
to compromised guest systems.
Threats to the event integrity come from two ways. First, events from the guest VMs
can be forged by fake agents. Second, true events might be intercepted and falsified, or
just dropped. In our prototype, events are associated with senders’ identifications. The
communication layer verifies whether the events are from the claimed sender processes.
Agents in the Dom0 further verify the integrity of the communication layer and guest VMs.
For instance, some events leave memory traces such as the ‘task’ for process creation in
the guest kernel. Leveraging memory inspection tools such as XenAccess [49], we can
check whether the events matches the current process list. Tools like [52, 51] can verify the
integrity of the guest kernel thus guarantee that the agent and the communication layer is
not compromised. Lares [50] can protect important kernel hooks from circumvention thus
guarantee the events are properly delivered.
3.2 Basic Behavior Events
Context agents monitor systems’ and applications’ behavior based on interactions between
applications and systems, and communications to and from storages and networks. Two
types of information are useful for our model. First, we want to know what resources an
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Table 4: Basic System Events
EVT_SYS_APP_EXEC Events at process creation, fork,
EVT_SYS_APP_FORK and termination time.
EVT_SYS_APP_EXIT
EVT_SYS_TCP_LISTEN Events when applications listen on
EVT_SYS_TCP_ACCEPT certain ports, accept connection
EVT_SYS_TCP_CONNECT requests, establish outbound
EVT_SYS_TCP_RELEASE connections, release connections.
EVT_SYS_FILE_OPEN Events when applications open,
EVT_SYS_FILE_CLOSE close files, and when their read
EVT_SYS_FILE_READ or write pattern change.
EVT_SYS_FILE_WRITE
EVT_SYS_PKT_TCP Events for incoming and outgoing
EVT_SYS_PKT_UDP network packets.
application uses. Second, we want to act on certain application operations. Collecting in-
formation of the first type requires only simple queries on system states. For the second
type, Linux, as the base of our prototype, is not equipped with enough hooks that we can
learn of the events that we are interested in. In order to collect events related to processes,
file operations, and socket operations, we implement a hook-based event notification mech-
anism in Linux. It consists of a list of hook functions, pieces of code to invoke those hooks
in places where interesting events happen, and an API that allows kernel modules to install
callbacks.
Table 4 lists the system events we collect to analysis systems’ and applications’ behav-
iors. There is one agent identified as ‘Linux-Guest-Events’ responsible for the first three
types, and another one identified as ‘Guest-Packet-Sniffer’ for the last type. The first agent
runs as a kernel module inside a Linux guest system. The second agent is a kernel module
in Dom0 based on ProtectIT TCP interception described in [34]. The two agents generate
events broadcasting through the TEvent.
Process-type events are useful to construct the active process list, detect unknown pro-
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Figure 10: Flowchart of a Typical Context Agent.
events describe the working set of an application, and its access pattern—sequential access
or random access. Socket-type and packet-type events can be used to detect suspicious
connections and derive statistic traffic patterns for anomaly detection etc. There are other
events left out of our prototype at this moment that are also useful. For instance, block level
storage access can be an important supplement source of file access related events [49].
3.3 Context Agents
Context agents are certified entities that are trusted to provide reliable context informa-
tion for TBAC engines. Except for low-level system event collection agents, most context
agents are standalone processes running in the dom0 in our prototype. To collect context
information, an agent accepts relevant system events, queries for events, and/or uses moni-
toring data produced by third parties. It then responds to queries from TDPs making claims
about the current context in answer events.
Figure 10 describes the basic flow of a typical context agent. An agent first registers
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itself to the TEvent and creates a default instance. It specifies its interests in basic system
events and invokes necessary context agents which it relies on. Then it sends queries of
either on-change mode or periodic mode to these agents for continuous event feeds. Next, it
reads in pending events for all active instances. For control events, it creates new instances
or releases existing instances. For basic system events and answer events from other agents,
it updates the agent’s and instances’ status, generates answer events for active queries that
are on-change based. The steps to acquire information from third party software is not
listed in the flowchart as they are in a similar fashion. Finally, if the event is a fresh query,
it attaches the query to the proper instance waiting for further processing.
There is a dedicated thread to process all queries. For each query attached on an in-
stance, it generates an answer event first. After that, based on the access mode, it either
discards the query, or puts it into an on-change query list or an on-period query list. There
is a signal based timer to trigger new answer events for active queries that are in periodic
mode.
As shown in figure 10, context agents share common structures. It is possible to pro-
vide a template that represents the common structure so programmers can focus on agent-
specific details only. Figure 11 outlines the important pieces of an agent template in C++.
For clarity purpose, parameters and return types are omitted for method signatures. Pro-
gramers derive classes from TContextAgent, TAgentInstance, TContextAttr, and TCon-
textQuery to fill in agent-specific details. The derived classes need to implement virtual
methods that begin with lower case letters. Methods begin with uppercase letters represent
common steps usable by all agents.
Methods in TContextAgent represent the basic flow of an agent process. The derived
class implements newInstance to create proper agent instances. The derived instance class
of TAgentInstance handles system events and answer events from other agents in methods
onS ysEvent and onAnswerEvent, and updates the agent’s and per instance’s agent-specific
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class TContextAgent{
SetOption(); // set agent parameters for interests , registration etc.
Register(); // register as TEvent member.
MakeQuery(); // invoke agent relied on, send queries.
ProcessEvent(); // event processing loop.
newInstance(); // create new agent instance.
};
class TAgentInstance{
AddAttribute(); // setup attribute -value pair.
onSysEvent(); // process basic system events.
onAnswerEvent();// process anwer events for previous queries.
OnCtrlEvent(); // invoke, release instances.
OnQuery(); // attach queries to proper attribute class.
ChangeNotify(); // indicate certain attribute value changes.
};
class TContextAttr{
OnChange(); // process attached on-change based queries.
OnPeriod(); // process attached on-period based queries.
};
class TContextQuery{
answerQuery(); // generate and push answer event out.
isChanged(); // will new answer be different from the last one?
};
Figure 11: Basic Template of Context Agent
status. The class TContextAttr is the abstract of context claims. It maintains lists of ac-
tive on-change and on-period queries represented by class TContextQuery. The derived
query class of TContextQuery should implement answerQuery to create answer events and
isChanged to tell whether the answer is different now from the last check.
3.4 Context Agent Examples
The TBD prototype uses context agents to determine three trust factors for our driver appli-
cations. First, data access operations should be reasonable in terms of locations of access,
access-time, end user roles, etc. Second, data access requests should be from well behaved
applications and systems. Third, the recipients of data should not inappropriately propa-
gate data. The corresponding context agents that are able to collect such information are
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described next. We introduce several typical context agents for evaluating context in these
three aspects.
3.4.1 Device Monitor
Computer systems rely on attached devices to perform various functionalities. Network
interface cards, either wired or wireless, provide communication support for network ap-
plications. In ubiquitous and pervasive computing, applications need all kinds of sensors to
provide information about light, movement, proximity etc. In TDPs, we are concern about
the impact on information safety of those devices. For instance, wired connections and
wireless connections has different properties in terms of security. A location sensor can tell
us whether a computer is in a place where it should be.
Ideally for detecting the location, we expect a sensor device like the Cricket sensor [53]
which uses a combination of RF and ultrasound technologies to provide location infor-
mation to attached host devices. Unfortunately, our prototype testbed does not have such
devices. As an alternative solution, we assume that there are devices fixed in locations. So
we can know of the computer location by checking the installed devices. In our experi-
ment, we choose USB devices that have unique serial numbers. It can also use PCI based
network interface cards with unique MAC addresses. The unique serial number is then
mapped to the actual location by a pre-defined mapping table or a remote database query.
Other queries supported by the agent include USB bus scan and PCI bus scan for device
vendor IDs and product IDs. We can then answer device related questions such as whether
the machine is using wired or wireless connections.
3.4.2 Guest Status
The security of a guest VM depends on many factors, the guest status agent provides an
overview on what is going on inside of a guest VM. It monitors process creation and ter-
mination events to construct the list of active processes. It answers queries about whether
a specific application such as anti-virus software is running, whether a specific connection
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is from an audited program, whether an application is created locally or through a SSH
session etc. Our prototype relies on system events described in section 3.2, and processes’
pathname inside of the kernel data structure. Realistic evaluation should include more
checks such as the authenticity of the executables.
3.4.3 TCP Status
Backdoors allow unauthenticated access to the system. Spyware collects information about
users without their knowledge. Malicious plugins of an otherwise trustable application can
leak user data to unauthorized parties. These network based attacks typically involve abnor-
mal network traffics. In our prototype, we implement a simple TCP status agent to collect
the TCP connection states and detect known anomaly. It can detect whether there are possi-
ble backdoors or spyware by checking listening ports and known bad connections, whether
an application involves in suspicious data transfer by checking the number of established
connections and the traffic volumes and destinations of connections.
3.4.4 Session Tracking
The CFC-TBAC model and the TDP implementation rely on properly maintained meta-
information to retain control over data. To control the propagation of information along the
entire data delivery path, we have to associate the access policy related meta-information
with data on transfer. such meta-information can be attached as customized fields in com-
munication protocols such as HTTP header fields or email MIME headers, or embedded
inside of the data itself such as keywords etc.
A session tracking agent can keep records of meta-information and hashed digests of
protected data objects to or from a node in order to trace the information flow. It either
peeks on traffic along the TDPs by leveraging the transparent interception mechanisms in
[34] and in chapter 4, or accepts inputs from cooperated applications and other components
of TDPs. The records are indexed by data digests based on the SHA1 hash function [12],
and the correctness relies on the rarity of collision of such hash functions.
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Table 5: Overhead of Context Agents and TEvent
Local (ms) Remote (ms)
Context agent joining TEvent 0.0036 N/A
Invoking context agent (reuse instance) 0.0015 47.89
Invoking context agent (new instance) 0.0206 48.50
Process information (agent in Dom0 kernel) 0.0034 N/A
Context agent ability check 0.0143 0.41
USB device serial 5.12 7.03
Location by device serial 0.26 0.40
File digesting 1.69 N/A
3.4.5 Application Behavior
The trust in TDPs depends not only on the security of the system, but also on whether
an application behaves as what it suppose to be. Application-specific agents can check
whether an application behaves appropriately. For example, such agents might check rules
concerning the servers with which an application can establish connections, the ports on
which an application can listen for incoming requests, and/or where an application can
store data, etc.
3.5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the event delivery system, and several typ-
ical context agents. The experiments are conducted in a giga-link LAN with multiple Xen
platforms. The main testbed machine has an Intel Core2Duo processor of 2.6GHz with 4G
memory, and a 2.1 GHz Core2Duo machine with 4G memory serves as the remote partner.
TDP software components use query events to collect context information from context
agents. Here, we measure the basic latency for queries to those agents. The upper part of
table 3.5 shows the one time cost to use the TEvent middleware setting up query channels
to context agents. The lower part shows the latency of several typical query types: (1) an
agent running in Dom0’s kernel providing process information about guest systems; (2)
a user-level agent answering queries about what kind of context it monitors; (3) a device






















Figure 12: CPU utilization of file SHA1 digesting
an environment agent talking with a backend database to map device serial numbers to
locations of the devices; and (5) a session tracking agent calculating the digest of a 256K
size file. The table shows different overheads of various context agents. Compared to the
latency of socket communication shown in later figures, the latency of context queries is
mostly trivial. Moreover, some of the queries, such as for USB device serial numbers, incur
only one time costs and can be amortized.
Context agents typically run passively and do not consume much computing resources.
However, there are certain agents that actively monitor applications’ ongoing transactions.
One example is the session tracking agent which keeps records of protected data objects
that an application receives and sends. Figure 12 shows the CPU utilization when the agent
calculates SHA1 hash [12] of an in memory file. Initially we send queries to the agent at
various frequency and measure the CPU utilization using getrusage. However, getrusage
does not return reliable values, neither does system utilities like vmstat. The reported uti-
lization keeps lower than 2% until suddenly it jumps to more than 70%. So we use an
alternative method that asks the agent to calculate digests for a file continuously (e.g. us-
ing 100% CPU time), and then derive the CPU utilization for various request frequencies.
Results show that digesting requires moderate processing power – digesting 10 megabytes
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The CFC approach adjusts data sharing in response to dynamically observed changes in
application behaviors and/or in the properties of shared hardware or systems. One of de-
sign goals is to control the information flow transparently and invisibly to communicating
parties. To achieve this purpose, the TDP implementation performs packet interception
and manipulation of network traffic of guest VMs at the driver level in the privileged driver
domain, e.g. Dom0 in Xen. It redirects traffic to interception runtimes, and then inserts
processed results back into the normal data stream.
In this chapter, we first introduce the driver level interception mechanism on a para-
virtualized platform. We then introduce two methods of processing the network protocol
layers of intercepted traffics. Next, we explain how to use interception runtimes to process
application layer protocols including secure links, and how to integrate the TBAC enforce-
ment to apply restriction based flow control on the protected data shared. Experiment
results are presented at the end to demonstrate the effectiveness.
4.1 Network Traffic Interception
The Xen para-virtualization platform consists of a VMM (e.g. the hypervisor) that man-
ages the hardware resources, guest VMs that run various operating systems, and a control
domain (Dom0) that manages guest VMs and maps physical devices to virtual devices for
guest VMs. The virtual network interface cards for a guest VM are linked to physical de-
vices managed by the Dom0. A virtual network device driver in the guest system does not
talk to hardware directly. Instead, it works as a front-end that relays device level packets
between the guest system and the corresponding back-end in the Dom0. Using socket con-
nections as examples, application data passes through network stacks to form IP packets,
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a front-end driver passes IP packets to a corresponding back-end driver which then routes
packets to the real NIC device.
There are multiple places where we can intercept a socket connection. One place is
inside of the network stacks of the guest system kernel as described in our previous work
[35]. It has the benefits of operating on application level payload data directly without
worry about all the communication protocol details such as TCP/IP headers and packet
order etc. However, the mechanism is subject to a compromised guest system. In the TDP
implementation, we choose device driver level interception by leveraging Xen’s network
I/O structures. The hypervisor provides the necessary isolation guarantee to assure the
trustiness of the interception.
4.1.1 Packet Interception
The interception of network packets in the TDP implementation occurs at the network
back-end driver level. We patch Xen’s network device management part with two hooks
— when outgoing packets arrive from front-ends of guest systems and when incoming
packets are ready to route to front-ends. A kernel module can register its callbacks if it is
interested in communication between back-ends and front-ends. Each callback takes an IP
packet as input and returns a boolean indicating whether the module consumes the packet
or not. We also export two API functions that allow a module to inject new packets into
either incoming or outgoing packet processing paths. So a module can consume the old
packets of an intercepted socket connection, process the data in the packets, reassemble
new packets with processed results, and inject them back to the original packet flow.
In our prototype, the core of the packet interception is a rule-based management module
named iccore. A rule defines the socket connections to intercept and operations to apply
on. To maximize the flexibility, the rule registration takes a list of callback functions as
parameters. Table 6 lists all the callbacks necessary for the registration. The iccore enu-
merates all registered rules when it sees the first SYN packet of a TCP/IP connection. For
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Table 6: Callbacks for Packet Interception Rule Registration
Callback Name Description
verify verify whether a packet matches the rule.
instance create an instance of a matched connection.
packetin process an incoming packet.
packetout process an outgoing packet.
release release an instance.
each rule, it calls veri f y for rule matching. If matched, it then creates an instance using
instance. The iccore maintains a hash-table of ‘IPs:ports’ to matched rules, thus future
packets belonging to this connection are routed to either packetin or packetout efficiently.
There are two types of rules depending on actions applied on intercepted packets. Pas-
sive rule based interception peeks on packet data and does not affect the traffic. Active rule
based interception modifies the packets, consumes the packets, and/or injects new packets
to the intercepted connections. The current prototype allows one active rule and multiple
passive rules per intercepted connection.
4.1.2 ProtectIT
The interception point at the back-end driver level is between the data link layer and the
network layer. Packets contain application data, transport layer information (TCP/UDP
headers) and network layer information (IP headers) at this point. However, the restriction
filters in the TBAC model operate on application data only. To bridge the packet intercep-
tion and the TBAC enforcement, we need extract application level data from raw packets
based on the network layer and transport layer information.
ProtectIT is a self-contained TCP/IP interception implementation built as two kernel
modules — a TCP/IP stack simulator and an interception manager. ProtectIT works on the
bidirectional data of an intercepted TCP/IP connection. For intercepted packets, the stack
simulator reorders and reassembles them to extract application level data. The data is then
ready for processing through the interception manager. The interception manager organizes
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all intercepted connections and relays the data to special application services, termed as
interception runtimes. Processed data is pushed from interception runtimes down to the
interface manager, then through the stack simulator who disassembles the data into small
IP packets and injects them back to the connection.
The interception manager provides an interface for registering interception runtime and
for making ProtectIT rules. Each interception runtime owns a unique runtime name. A
ProtectIT rule defines the connections and interception runtime association using pairs of a
connection matching pattern and a runtime name. A connection matching pattern specifies
the ranges of TCP/IP source addresses, destination addresses, source ports and destination
ports. The interception manager translates a ProtectIT rule into an rule used by the iccore
by defining the verify callback based on the pattern specification. Details on how a matched
connection is processed are explained below.
When there is a new connection that matches a ProtectIT rule, the TCP/IP stack sim-
ulator creates an instance for it. Application level data from subsequent packets is accu-
mulated in the instance through packetin and packetout. The interception manager moves
data from the instance to buffers for interception runtimes using APIs copy_ f rom_... listed
in table 7. The associated interception runtime uses read and write system calls to read
data from and write processed results to buffers. Then the interception manager moves data
back to the instance using APIs copy_to_... The TCP/IP stack simulator then processes
the results and assembles new IP packets. The stack simulator maintains necessary status
information about the intercepted connection, particularly for sequence numbers, acknowl-
edge numbers, and checksums to make sure the integrity of the TCP/IP connection not
compromised.
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Table 7: TCP Stack Simulator Interface
Callback Name Description
copy_from_runtime_in move original data from intercepted connection
copy_from_runtime_out to runtime.
copy_to_runtime_in move processed result from runtime to TCP/IP
copy_to_runtime_out stack simulator.
data_runtime_in whether there is data available for processing
data_runtime_out by associated runtime.
space_runtime_in whether there is space available for creating
space_runtime_out new packets base on TCP window size.
4.1.3 Proxy-based Interception
The TDP implementation provides another implementation of TCP/IP interception using
transparent proxies. It utilizes the existing TCP/IP network stacks and the Netfilter frame-
work in the kernel of the Dom0. The idea is to manipulate packet headers of intercepted
packets so that the system treats the packets as a part of socket connections owned by proxy
processes in the Dom0.
Using proxy-based interception, the TDP implementation assigns one TCP port to each
interception runtime. The interception runtime creates a socket and listens on the assigned
port. Here we use an example to illustrate the interception steps. Suppose a client appli-
cation running in a guest VM establishes a TCP/IP connection to a remote server. The
interception mechanism will convert the connection into two separated ones — A and B
transparently. Connection A is from the client application to the interception runtime, and
connection B is from the interception runtime to the remote server. Figure 13 shows the
actual packet flow. For packets originated from the client application, it changes the des-
tination fields so packets appear to be for connection A. For packets originated from the
remote server, it changes the destination fields so packets appear to be for connection B.
Similarly, for packets from the interception runtime on connection A, it changes the source

























Figure 13: Transparent Proxy Based Interception.
e.g. from the remote server. The source fields of packets from the interception runtime on
connection B are modified similarly.
The manipulation of packet headers for an intercepted traffic relies on the iccore module
for packet to/from guest VMs, and on Netfilter for packets to/from remote nodes. Netfilter
is a general packet-control framework within Linux. The packet reception and send routines
inside of the Linux kernel invoke run through a list of registered hooks of Netfilter. There
are different places for different types of hooks such as packet reception (PREROUTING),
locally delivered (INPUT), forwarded (FORWARD), locally output (OUTPUT) and packet
send (POSTROUTING). Our prototype use a PREROUTING hook for packets from remote
nodes, and a POSTROUTING hook for packets to remote nodes.
4.1.4 Discussions
Both the ProtectIT and the transparent proxy based interception mechanisms have their
advantages and limitations. The first mechanism has more control over the traffic. It can
easily switch from interception mode to non-interception mode for the same connection,
and it can easily peek at packets for monitoring purposes. With the second mechanism,
interceptions are per connection, and this consumes local port resources, which may create
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potential security issues. Further, monitoring the connection requires full interception.
However, since the transparent proxy mode uses the existing system network stack, it can
leverage that more stable and optimized code. Moreover, it is easy to set up the interception
runtime in a dedicated domain, by manipulating only the packet headers.
Monitoring is another use case for passive interception. For instance, a network packet
monitor agent can set up passive interception rules, peek on the intercepted packets without
interfering the original packet delivery path. Another example is a context agent monitoring
application level data of TCP/IP connections. It uses the ProtectIT mechanism with cloned
packets. In this way, the agent works on duplicates and the connection keeps the original
packets.
4.2 Secure Connection
Application level data extracted by the previously mention interception mechanisms con-
tains both data objects and the necessary application level protocol information. It is
straightforward to operate on data objects for a plaintext communication. However, when
there is encryption involved in the protocol, handling of data objects requires knowledge
about the encryption and decryption process. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [20] and the
successor Transport Layer Security (TLS) [11], e.g. SSL 3.1 unofficially, are popular
cryptographic protocols that provide security for communications over networks. In this
section, we will explain how the TDP implementation addresses secure connections using
SSL as an example.
4.2.1 SSL Introduction
The goal of the SSL protocol is to secure the communication between two applications.
It uses TCP/IP on behalf of application-level protocols such as HTTP or SMTP. It allows
the client and the server to confirm each other’s identity, and to negotiate for an encrypted
communication. A typical SSL session involves handshakes for server authentication and
optional client authentication, and encrypted communication for deliver private application
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data.
Server authentication in the SSL protocol uses digital certificates. A digital certificate
contains the public key of the server, the validity period, domain names, and a digital
signature of the certificate issuer. To authenticate a server, the client makes sure that 1) the
certificate is in validity period, 2) the issuer is a trusted certificate authority, 3) the certificate
is integrated based on issuer’s signature, and 4) server’s domain name matches. Once
authenticated, the client uses the embedded public key to exchange secrets with the server.
They then use the secrets to create symmetric keys for encrypted secure communication.
4.2.2 Delegation of SSL Setup
When a client application can be configured to use either SSL connection or plaintext con-
nections, delegating SSL setup solves the problem easily. Using proxy-based interception
as an example, the client-server connection is separated into one plaintext connection be-
tween the interception runtime and the client, and one secure connection between the in-
terception runtime and the server. Since the interception runtime is in charge of the SSL
connection, it operates on plaintext data with both connections. This solution can also ben-
efit client applications that are not capable of secure communications. For example, we can
use a simple telnet program to connect to a SSL-enabled mail server using this approach.
4.2.3 SSL Repackaging
When a client application need talk with the server directly using the SSL protocol, the
SSL delegation method does not work anymore. The handling of the SSL protocol layers
is inside of the server and the client application. The interception runtime can only get SSL
records containing encrypted application data. The TDP software implements a SSL record
decryption and re-encryption mechanism, termed as SSL repackaging, with help from the
owner of the server’s private key.
Figure 14 shows typical messages exchanged during a SSL handshake. The client sends




{ version ≤ 3.1; random; session_id;
cipher suites; compress methods }
←− Handshake:Server-Hello
{ version=3.1; random; session_id;
cipher= ‘AES256_SHA’; compress=0 }
←− Handshake:Server-Certificate









Figure 14: SSL Handshake Example.
other information. The server replies a hello message with the selected SSL version, cipher
algorithm, and compress method etc. The server then sends the client its certification for
authentication. Once authenticated, the client creates the pre-master-secret and encrypts it
with the server’s public key. The server gets the encrypted pre-master-secret and decrypts
it using its private key. Now both the client and the server know the pre-master-secret, so
they can generate the same session key. After the client and the server issue the Change-
Cipher-Spec message, following SSL records are then encrypted using the selected cipher
algorithm with the session key.
The exchange of cipher suites and the choice is in plaintext, so we know what cipher
algorithm that two communicating parties agree on. However, the pre-master-secret is en-
crypted with the server’s public key and can only be decrypted using the corresponding
private key. The TDP implementation assumes that it can get help from the private key
owner — through some services running along with the server. With this assumption, the
interception runtime acquires the decrypted pre-master-secret, generates the same session
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Figure 15: SSL Repackaging Demo
key, and decrypts and re-encrypts the SSL traffic. The implementation of SSL repackaging
leverages the openssl library so we can use its encryption, decryption and HMAC proce-
dures.
Figure 15 demonstrates a successfully intercepted SSL connection. All SSL records
after the ‘Change Cipher’ message are encrypted, including the ones containing questions
from the client and the answers from the server. The proxy changes the text from the client
to all uppercases, and changes the text from the server to all lowercases.
4.3 Interception Runtime
When a packet from an intercepted connection reaches an interception runtime, it contains
both real data and application level protocol information such as HTTP or SMTP etc. The
interception runtime unwraps the application protocol layer, extracts the real data, applies
TBAC specified restriction filters, rewraps with application protocol information and feeds
the final result to the original connection. We will describe the interface and the compo-
nents of an interception runtime in details below.
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4.3.1 Runtime Interface
An interception runtime is characterized by the types of application layer protocols and
data objects that it handles. The TDP implementation assigns distinct names to differ-
ent interception runtimes. An interception runtime registers itself by runtime_register
with its unique name. It then calls runtime_accept for intercepted connections. The
runtime_accept call returns four file descriptors — two read-only ones and two write-
only ones representing the input and output points of an intercepted connection separately.
The interception runtime uses two read-only descriptors to read in the inward and outward




create socket sock and listen on port
proxy_runtime_register(name,sock)→ runtimeproxy
combine runtimeproxy and sock→ runtime
runtime_accept(runtime) → rdinward, wrinward, rdoutward, wroutward
protectit_runtime_accept(runtime)→ f dinward, f doutward
f dinward → rdinward,wrinward; f doutward → rdoutward,wroutward
accept new connection on runtime : sock→ connA
proxy_runtime_check_orig_dest(connA)→ destination
setup socket connection to destination→ connB
if connA is outbound
connA → rdoutward,wrinward; connB → rdinward,wroutward
else
connA → rdinward,wroutward; connB → rdoutward,wrinward
Figure 16: Interception Runtime Interface.
TDP software implements two TCP/IP interception mechanisms in the kernel space of
Dom0. The interception runtime framework works with both mechanisms. A thin interface
layer translates the interception runtime APIs into ones used by the interception manager
module of the ProtectIT and the proxy manager module of the transparent-proxy intercep-
tion. Figure 16 shows the mapping from runtime APIs to APIs of the interception manager




















Trust Data Path Runtime
Figure 17: Runtime Composition.
For ProtectIT-based interception, the translation is pretty straightforward as shown in
the figure. For transparent-proxy based interception, mapping for interception runtime
APIs involves several steps. Each interception runtime needs a free port and creates a lis-
tening socket on it. The registration of the interception runtime takes both its name and the
socket as input. Accepting a new intercepted connection involves two socket connections
from the interception runtime to both ends of the intercepted connection — accepting a
socket from one end and establishing one to another end. The interception runtime then
sits between the two sockets working like a transparent proxy. The four file descriptors of
the interception runtime are then mapped to the socket descriptors of two socket connec-
tions separately.
4.3.2 Runtime Composition
The interception runtime needs to handle both application layer protocols and data objects.
Although our prototype does not limit how an interception runtime should be implemented,
the workflow reveals the possibility of a modularized implementation. A runtime consists
of series of function units that perform protocol unwrapping, data object manipulation,
and protocol wrapping, respectively. By making each function unit an independent code
piece, it enables the reuse of same units in different interception runtimes. For instance,
interception runtimes that intercept HTTP traffics with different data objects can share the
same HTTP protocol unwrapping and wrapping code.
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The composition of runtimes depends on the desired workflow on intercepted connec-
tions. Figure 17 shows an interception runtime targeting secure HTTP connections. The
interception runtime links together five function units that perform SSL decryption, HTTP
unwrapping, data object manipulation, HTTP rewrapping, and SSL encryption in turn. Be-
cause each network communication contains both inward and outward traffic when viewed
from one side, the function unit, termed actionlet, handles both traffic. The interception
runtime feeds the data from the read-only descriptors rdinward and rdoutward to the two in-
put points of the first actionlet. The actionlet processes the data and relays the processed
result to the next actionlet. The last actionlet feeds the final result to the two write-only
descriptors wrinward and wroutward.
class TActionletBlock; // block of data passed by actionlets
class TActionlet{
TRuntime *runtime; // runtime instance it belongs to.
TActionlet *prev, *next; // to form actionlet chain in runtime
InputData(TActionletBlock*, int); // input points of inward/outward traffic
TActionletBlock* OutputData(int); // output points of processed traffic
int GetStatus(void); // whether it can do something
int Resume(void); // process data and pass to next actionlet
};
class TRuntimeFlow{
int fd_rd_in , fd_wr_in; // file descriptors for input from interception
int fd_rd_out , fd_wr_out; // file descriptors for output to interception
TActionlet *actHead; // head of the actionlet chain
TGateActionlet *actTail; // tail of chain to interact with interface layer
......
int InsertActionlet(TActionlet *); // setup actionlet chain
int Resumable(void); // whether there is anything to do
int Resume(void); // call all actionlets to do what they can
};
Figure 18: Base classes of Interception Runtime and Actionlet (simplified)
Interception Runtimes and actionlets are implemented as C++ classes or C structures
with associated functions in our prototype. Figure 18 shows the simplified base class defini-
tion. TRuntimeFlow represents the workflow on an intercepted connection, and T Actionlet
65
is the abstract of actionlets that form the workflow. Programmers derive their classes from
these two to cover runtime-specific details. For illustration purpose, we use the name of the
base classes for any derived classes hereafter. TRuntimeFlow contains four file descrip-
tor to interact with in-kernel interception. There are two derived classes T ActionletEntry
and T ActionletExit working as default end points for the workflow interacting with the file
descriptors.
For a concrete interception workflow, an instance of TRuntimeFlow is created, and
multiple instances of T Actionlet are inserted using the method InsertActionlet. All
T Actionlet instances form a double linked list as an actionlet chain. The status of an ac-
tionlet can be characterized by three factors: 1) whether it has spaces to accumulate new
data; 2) whether it has accumulated data that it can process right now; and 3) whether it has
processed data to output. A workflow is ‘resumable’ if it can do something to move the in-
tercepted traffic through the actionlet chain. The ‘resumable’ status depends on the status of
all actionlets in the chain. The Resumable method in TRuntimeFlow invokes GetStatus
for all T Actionlet(s) in the chain to see whether 1) there is any actionlet that has data ready
to process, or 2) there is any pair of adjacent actionlets where the first one has processed
data and the next one has spaces. To resume a workflow, it reads data from the intercepted
connection, feeds data to the entry actionlet T ActionletEntry if it has spaces, invokes each
actionlet to process its accumulated data, and feeds data from one actionlet’s output point
to the next one’s input point through a pair of methods – OutputData and InputData.
The implementation of any derived T Actionlet class must be self-contained. An action-
let should not rely on other actionlets for its own functionality. For instance, an actionlet
should not assume that actionlets in front of it in the chain can buffer data for it. If the
actionlet needs to hold a complete data objet before processing, it must prepare enough
buffer spaces to store the object. Otherwise, it might stall the processing when it is waiting
for data but there is no buffer space to read from the intercepted connection.
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Block Data Descriptor:
NestLevel : Current nest level of paired actionlets
ContentType[NestLevel] : 1 (for meta-infomration) | 0 (for data)
Index[NestLevel] : Index of block
Name[NestLevel] : What the block is
BodyIndex[NestLevel] : Index for multiple blocks of the same data object
Body : Pointer to and size of data content for the block
Figure 19: Descriptor for Block Exchanged between Actionlets
4.3.3 Data Exchange among Actionlets
A workflow consists of actionlets for application layer protocols and for data objects wrapped
in protocols. Protocol actionlets are paired for unwrapping and wrapping protocol infor-
mation to ensure the integrity of interception. Because there might be multiple layers of
protocols, we see a workflow as being comprised of nested protocol actionlet pairs with
data manipulation actionlets in the middle, as illustrated in Figure 17. Suppose we need
to apply access control on an email, where the actual data to be manipulated are the text
body and the file attachments. For such manipulation, one actionlet is used to disassemble
the email and another one to reassemble it. An email is disassembled into a body part and
multiple attachment parts. Each part contains a header and data. The data manipulation
actionlet is only interested in the data. Headers are useful for later actionlets for message
reassembling.
Actionlets exchange data in blocks. The input blocks to an actionlet are categorized
into three types: 1) blocks that contain data for the actionlet to process; 2) blocks that
contain meta-information to help the actionlet; and 3) blocks which the actionlet does not
understand. For an email unwrapping actionlet, a type 1 block can be partial data of an
email message; a type 2 block can be an indicator of the end of transfer of an email message;
a type 3 block can be an POP3 or SMPT command processed by the previous actionlet. An
actionlet processes type 1 blocks, consumes type 2 blocks, and passes type 3 blocks to the
next actionlet directly. Type 3 blocks are usually protocol related information output from
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a protocol unwrapping actionlet and consumed by the paired wrapping actionlet at the end.
For instance, a block of email headers are not understandable by the actionlet that processes
the email attachment. But the block is used by the email wrapping actionlet to reconstruct
the email.
Figure 19 shows the basic descriptor of an exchanging block. Because the actionlet
chain consists of nested pairs of protocol unwrapping and wrapping actionlets, the block
contains a nest level indicator and a stack for block specification. An protocol unwrapping
actionlet increases the nest level and push the block specification into the stack. The corre-
sponding wrapping actionlet pops the block specification from the stack and decrease the
nest level.
4.3.4 Data Manipulation Actionlet
Sitting in the middle of the interception workflow, a data manipulation actionlet performs
three key functionalities for the TBAC enforcement of TDPs. First, it identifies what kind
of data objects are in communication. Second, it evaluates the surrounding context of the
data recipient to get the current trust vector. Third, it acquires necessary restriction filters
and applies them on data objects.
The meta-information about data objects, e.g. information related to the TBAC policy
specification comes in three ways. It can be embedded inside of application layer protocols
such as HTTP header fields or email MIME headers. A protocol unwrapping actionlet
parses the information and relays it to a data manipulation actionlet. The meta-information
can also be from a data object itself such as security related keywords etc. An actionlet can
also digest the data object and query a session tracking agent with the digest to see whether
the agent knows the object.
In our prototype, we use tags to represent the meta-information of protected data ob-
jects. Once a data manipulation actionlet gets an object’s tag, it locates the right context
vector agent through a TBAC engine and sends a query for the current trust vector. The
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actionlet then uses the trust vector to determine the applied restriction filter names based
on the TBAC specification.
All restrictions filters are implemented as exported functions in dynamically loadable
libraries, e.g. shared objects in our prototype. An actionlet loads libraries based on re-
striction filter names, then acquires the filter functions, and invokes functions with the
accumulated data objects to derive the suitably restricted objects.
4.4 Experiments
We evaluate the performance of interception mechanisms on a Intel Core 2 Duo 2.66 GHz
machine with 4G memory on a Gigabit LAN except for certain measurements for the Pro-
tectIT abstract. The system runs Xen virtual machine monitor 3.1. We perform measure-
ment for guest virtual machines that run Linux with 1G memory.
We first show the micro-benchmark test of interceptions using the ProtectIT abstract.
Then we switch to the proxy-based interception runtime. We measure the latency and
achievable throughput on intercepted connections, and the CPU utilization too.
4.4.1 ProtectIT Micro-benchmark
The ProtectIT abstract is developed on Xen virtual machine monitor 3.0. The micro-
benchmark is based on a Pentium IV 2.8GHz machine with Gigabit Ethernet links and
512M memory with Guest Linux systems using 128M memory each. We run micro-
benchmarks to show where the overhead of ProtectIT comes from.
The first measurement shows the basic overhead posed by the interception service on a
TCP/IP connection using ProtectIT. A small socket client application runs inside the guest
virtual machine, receiving or sending a data set from/to a remote server. The data sizes
range from 64 kilobytes to 1024 kilobytes. We compare five different cases to identify
interception overheads. Figure 20 shows the time consumed to receive one unit of the data
set for all cases. The first column is the baseline measurement for connections without






























































Figure 21: Overhead of Intercepted Outward Traffic using ProtectIT
rule. The third to fifth columns are all intercepted connections with different operations.
The third case directly processes the packet on the network receiving or sending path. The
fourth case buffers the data and then uses a kernel level dummy-copy actionlet. The fifth
case uses a user level runtime to run a dummy-copy actionlet.
The first two columns show almost the same results, which indicates that the overheads
for hooking interception services are negligible. The third shows that reconstructing new
packets, along the critical path of packet processing induces moderate overheads. That is

































Figure 22: Throughput of Intercepted Traffic using ProtectIT
level actionlets incur more overhead than those kernel level ones due to scheduling over-
head and additional copying and user-kernel boundary crossing. We observe very similar
results from figure 21 for intercepting outward data.
In figure 22, we use a multi-threaded client sending requests to a remote multi-threaded
server. It shows throughput with different number of threads. The results are similar for
different request data sizes in the medium range, which is why we depict a mid range size
of 256 kilobytes. For both incoming and outgoing traffic, we observe that the way we
handle packet bursts has a negative impact on the Xen virtualized network, particularly af-
fecting the exchange of packets between network front-ends and back-ends. As a result, the
throughput achieved when doing interception is significant lower. Using different, unstable
implementation can reduce this gap, which indicates that this difference is not inherent to
the interception mechanism, but rather a consequence of our current inefficient implemen-
tation.
4.4.2 Proxy-based Interception Micro-benchmark
Our simulated network stack is a simple prototype to demonstrate the ProtectIT mechanism.





















































Figure 24: Comparison of Latency on Receiving Data
when there are out-of-order packets or dropped packets. On the other hand, the proxy-
based interception uses the Dom0’s network system which is stable and highly optimized.
Here we measure the performance of the proxy-based interception in the aspect regarding
latency, throughput and CPU utilization.
We evaluate the costs of the data protection enforcement mechanism in an interception
runtime. Figure 23 shows experimental results for an intercepted client-server connection.






























Figure 25: Throughput Comparison
The columns from left to right in the figure show the latency for the cases of (1) the base-
line client-server connection, (2) using a client-aware proxy, and (3) using a transparent
interception runtime. The figure shows that our interception runtimes perform almost iden-
tically to the client-aware proxy. This is because packets go through exactly same paths for
these two cases. There are only small amounts of work being performed for manipulation
of TCP/IP addresses and adjusting checksums. For medium to large data size, proxy-based
solution incurs extra delay on latency for around 10-15%.
Figure 24 shows similar results for sending out N bytes of data. The gap between the
baseline connection and the proxy-based connection is much smaller here. This is because
of the high available bandwidth between the guest domain and the Dom0 when moving
outgoing data from the guest to the dom0.
The throughput achievable when using TDPs is measured in Figure 25. Here, a multi-
threaded client sends requests for downloading or uploading. Our interception runtime lags
behind baseline connections by only about 6%, and it lags behind client-aware proxies by
about 2%. For uploading data, it performs almost the same as the baseline, and is only
slightly slower than the client-aware proxy. Considering that large volume traffic is usually
observed at servers, this implies that throughput matters more for data being sent out, for



























Figure 26: CPU Utilization of Proxy-based Interception
We then measure the CPU utilization for proxy-based interception in figure 26. Here,
we use 16 client threads sending requests for downloading or uploading data of 1 megabytes.
As shown in the figure, processing outgoing traffic (uploading) by the interception runtime
incurs only moderate CPU overheads. It is because the guest VM can write data very
quickly to the Dom0 due to high available bandwidth between the guest domain and the
Dom0. The interception runtime can then read in large chunk of data each time. On the
other hand, processing incoming traffic (download) incurs large CPU overhead, it is be-
cause that network packets tend to arrive in small blocks. The interception runtime tries to
read data as soon as it comes, so it frequently check the socket and moving data from the
kernel space to user space. Comparing the overhead of two cases, we believe that the high
overhead for incoming traffic is not because that the interception runtime needs so much
processing power, but rather implementation related.
We next measure overheads of TDPs on a typical end user application. Figure 27 shows
that a HTTP response is intercepted. The HTTP message includes a header that contains
our additional meta-information fields, and a content body that needs to be protected. We
show in the figure the latency of (1) the baseline of an unprotected connection, (2) using the
transparent proxy and processing the data as it arrives, and (3) using the transparent proxy































































Figure 28: Latency on SMTP Traffic
when using a transparent proxy is about 10% if it is able to process partial data as it arrives.
If it needs to hold the data in some buffer, the delay increases to 20-30% for medium to
large data sizes.
We next measure the overheads of TDPs on an email client application. Figure 28
shows that an intercepted SMTP session. Email messages with attachments of different
sizes are sent out. Attachments are in plaintext mode or base64 encoded. We show in the
figure the latency of (1) the baseline of an unprotected connection, (2) using the transparent



































Figure 29: Latency on POP3 Traffic
proxy and processing data after receiving the complete plaintext attachment. Case 4 and
5 are same as 2 and 3 except that attachments are now base64 encoded. As shown in the
figure, processing the plaintext attachment as it arrives incurs only slight delay than the
baseline case. This is consistent with the micro-benchmark test in figure 24. Waiting for
the full attachment incurs moderate delay of around 20%, and processing base64 encoded
attachment increase the delay to 80%.
Figure 29 shows an intercepted POP3 session with same experiment cases. It shows
similar results as the intercepted SMTP session. The standard deviation of measured la-
tency is large so the figure is not as smooth as the SMTP case. We observe that even a small




The context flow control (CFC) approach utilizes a trust-based access control (TBAC)
model to protect data against inappropriate information disclosures due to potentially com-
promised systems and/or faulty or malicious applications. It deploys a TBAC policy on all
nodes along the data delivery path to establish a trusted data path (TDP) across providers,
intermediate nodes, and end nodes. In this chapter, we first describe the TDP software com-
ponents for TBAC policy specification, for TDP recognition, and for TBAC enforcement.
We next explain how to deploy those components into an existing distributed system. We
then present application examples to demonstrate the usefulness of the TDP software.
5.1 TDP Software Components
5.1.1 Access Restrictions and Trust Vectors
Access restrictions and trust vectors are two basic elements of the TBAC policy speci-
fication. Access restrictions define permissions on protected data objects. Trust vector
formulas define the mapping from the active context to the quantification of risks of inap-
propriate information disclosures. Combined with a mapping from trust vectors to access
restrictions, we have the specification of a TBAC policy.
TDP software defines access restrictions as filter functions. The filter functions are
organized based on restriction names and types of data objects (e.g. tags) on which fil-
ters apply. All filters for the same object type are grouped together into one dynamically
loadable library. A library is defined as:
Library := ( shared object, data object tags, { (restriction name, restriction filter) } )
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TDP software supports queries for libraries based on data object tags, and queries for re-
striction filters based on restriction names per library.
The trust vector formula can be either implemented as a standalone context agent or as
a loadable library which can then be integrated into the interception runtime dynamically.
TDP software maintains a database for formulas as following:
Tabledata2 f ormula := { (tags, formula) }
Table f ormula2context := { (formula,context agent) }
Table f ormula2library := { (formula,shared object) }
Table f ormula2restriction := { (formula,result,restriction name) }
It specifies the association of data types (tags) and formulas, context agents on which a for-
mula depends, libraries or agents in which formulas are implemented, and most importantly
how to map calculated trust vectors to names of access restrictions.
5.1.2 Interception Rules and Runtimes
The CFC approach focuses on network connections, particularly TCP/IP connections be-
tween communicating parties. It traces all connections that carry protected data objects,
and put them under control of TBAC engines to form TDPs. TDP software specifies inter-
ception rules that define 1) the above TCP/IP connections by IP addresses and ports; 2) the
interception runtimes that are capable of processing these connections; and 3) the nodes on
which to intercept. An interception rule is defined formally as following:
PatternIP := (network address, subnet mask)
Patternport := (minimum, maximum)
EndPoint := (PatternIP, Patternport)
Location := node identifier
RuntimeName := interception runtime name
InterceptionRule := ( EndPoint, EndPoint, Location, RuntimeName )
Interception runtimes are executable programs that process application layer protocols and
protected data objects in the TDP software. They are identified by distinct names that
describe their abilities. For instance, a ‘Care2X-HTTP-HTML’ runtime handles HTTP
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connections carrying HTML documents between client browsers and the front-end Web
server in the Care2X healthcare system.
The conversion from normal data delivery paths to trusted data paths proceeds in the
following order. Interception rules are translated into hooks in Dom0(s) of the specified
nodes, and related interception runtimes are up and running. Intercepted traffic is then
redirected to proper interception runtimes. Inside an interception runtime, protocol-related
actionlets process application layer protocols and parse any meta-information (tags) about
the contained data objects. Tags are then mapped to restriction libraries and trust vector
formulas. The data manipulation actionlets invoke the desired formulas, get the trust vector,
and locate the restriction filters. The interception runtimes then apply the restriction filters
and push the processed data objects back with rewrapped application layer protocols. As a
result, suitable restricted versions of the protected data objects are delivered to recipients.
5.2 Deploy TDP Software
Trusted data paths cannot be created without the existence of trusted places that are safe for
performing monitoring and enforcing trust-based access controls. Our prototype uses the
control domains of the Xen para-virtualized platform as such trusted places, and the im-
plementation assumes the use of Xen throughout the TDP framework. The implementation
also uses one centralized management server that maintains all the software components
needed and deploys them to participants. We have not yet considered scalability or relia-
bility issues that would require further enhancements of this simple implementation.
5.2.1 Deployment Interface
By default, we treat the management server as the root-of-trust. For each node that quali-
fies for TBAC deployment, there is a trusted data path frontend (TDPFront) running in the
Dom0 of the node. The TDPFront establishes a mutually authenticated secure connection
with the management server. In this way, the management server obtains a list of all qual-
ified nodes, and can certify the existence of a TBAC engine and the trustiness of context
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agents in the node’s Dom0.
The TDPFront presents an interface for the management server to 1) query the operating
system information of the Dom0; 2) deploy executable files, dynamically loadable libraries,
and kernel modules to desired locations; and 3) run the executable files or load the modules.
A file deployment message from the server deliver a named file to the TDPFront who then
stores it in the specified directory and invokes the embedded command. The message
contains elements as illustrated blow:
Type : application , or shared object, or kernel module
Descriptor : unique identifier linking to attached file
Version : version of attached file
Directory : location to store attached file
Name : name of attached file
Command : execute attached file or load it as module
Data : of attached file
Files with newer versions can replace existing ones. The data element is optional when
the files are already deployed. The server also supports the poll mode which allows the
TDPFront to issue a deployment message reversely asking for certain components. The
server uses the type and descriptor information to locate the files and issues new messages
to deliver the requested files.
Other than the TDPFront, there are other essential components for TDPs on each of the
participated nodes such as iccore for driver level hooks, nettcp for network stack simula-
tors, pathctrl for interception manager modules, netproxy for proxy manager modules, and
tevent for the event middleware etc. All those components need to be in place before the
node can join any trusted data path.
Components for setting up a trusted data path include interception rules, associated
interception runtimes, the restriction filter libraries, and the trust vector formulas. The
management server maintains the whole set of interception rules. Every time a node boots
up, the TDPFront is configured to run automatically. It contacts the server by establishing
a secure connection. The server enumerates all interception rules matching the node, and
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sends rule-setup messages. The TDPFront responds the messages by setting the rules up in
either nettcp or netproxy. At the same time, the server deploys and invokes the interception
runtimes specified in the rules. If the interception rules have associated components like
restriction libraries, trust vector formulas, and depended context agents, the server deploys
them too. Otherwise, when actual interception happens, the interception runtime will re-
quest for missing pieces through the TDPFront using reverse deployment messages to the
management server.
5.3 Applications
5.3.1 Care2X — Healthcare Information System
In the Care2X system, the backend database is the source of protected patient information.
The Web server works as a frontend to grant to end users permissions to access certain
patient records. The data delivery path therefore, involves the backend database node, the
Web server node, and various end user nodes. While core system nodes like the database
and web server are typically equipped with sufficient security measures, such assumptions
cannot be made about end-user nodes that may be configured in various ways and operate
in changing environments, thus presenting different risks of information misuse. Evaluat-
ing the potential risks and determining appropriate access restrictions depends on proper
interpretations of the security and privacy policies in place. We demonstrate the usefulness
of the TDP abstraction for the Care2X application using the following settings.
Protected patient records in Care2X contain both personal identifiers and treatment
records. So, a HTML page served to end users is tagged as Care2X for tracking policies,
HTML for message format, and identifier and treatment for its content. For fields belonging
to the identifier group, we define three restriction filters that separately blank out critical
personal information such as social security number (SSN), or general data such as names
and addresses, or hospitalization related items such as patient-id. For fields belonging to
the treatment group, we define two restrictions that separately blank out important data like
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diagnosis and doctor notes, or routine checks like body temperatures. All filters are im-
plemented in two libraries associated with tags (Care2X, HTML, identifier) and (Care2X,
HTML, treatment). Individual filters are assigned unique restriction names.
We consider risks of information misuse with respect to two items of contextual infor-
mation. One is the reasonableness of the access operations. The other is the security of
the client side system. We classify reasonableness as {high, medium, low, not}, and client
system security as {strong, weak, unknown}. We then associate these evaluations with dif-
ferent restriction names, as described earlier in tables 1 and 2. The above classification
of reasonableness and security depends on formulas translated from security and privacy
policies. In our prototype, we evaluate reasonableness based on access locations, time, etc,
and we evaluate system security based on the detection of suspicious processes, listening
ports, and the existence of unexpected network connections.
An interception rule is applied as a response to all of the risks listed above. It is de-
ployed to all TBAC-enabled nodes, where each such rule specifies the Web server by its IP
address and listening port. The rule runs with a linked runtime that is able to perform HTTP
processing (i.e., it can handle the application layer protocol) and can apply the restrictions
mentioned above. For machines that are not capable of TBAC enforcement, we can deploy
a different interception rule at the server side that applies restrictions based on whether the
client machine is TBAC-enabled.
5.3.2 Online-storage and Email
Another sample application – cooperative data sharing – is used to demonstrate the prop-
agation control ability of trusted data paths. In this application, the data delivery path can
be from client to online storage, from client to client via mail servers, or a composition of
both. In addition to the risks considered in the earlier example, we also evaluate the possi-
bility of improper data propagation. In other words, we ask the following question: when
recipients of protected information try to relay such information, are the related protection
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policies still in effect?
Propagation control depends on who has access to the protected information at the re-
cipient side. If the recipient stores the data into secure places or uses protection policies
when relaying data, we can say the information is still under control. Of course, appli-
cations run by participating parties may claim such controls but then not use them. In
response, the TDP implementation uses a context agent to observe whether some connec-
tion belongs to such an application, and further, whether the application actually does what
it claims. This again demonstrates the best-effort nature of TDP, where the observations
made depend on the applications in use and the security concerns of participating entities.
To demonstrate the utility of TDP, we have developed a specialized client able to access
Web server-based online storage and send emails. It claims that it will neither save data
to files nor send out non-tagged email attachments. If the email server is part of a TDP,
then (1) tagged emails remain under its control, (2) its propagation control abilities may
be described as ‘whether the connection is from such a client’ and ‘whether it saves files’,
and (3) we can verify whether outgoing emails are properly tagged. Toward that end, we
compare attachments with the files opened by this application and with the data it acquires
from online storage. This is done via a session tracking agent that keeps records of the
tags and information digests of protected information items. This permits us to evaluate
whether attachments match any protected information. Comparisons based on information
digests made for this purpose rely in their correctness on the rarity of collision of such hash
functions (SHA1 in our prototype) [12].
5.3.3 Demonstration
We have conducted experiments for above two applications to demonstrate the usefulness
of the TDP software. Figure 30(a) shows part of a patient information page delivered for
a highly reasonable access and 30(b) for a medially reasonable access. The social security
number is removed from the page in the second case. The context agent used here queries
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(a) Patient Information (High)
(b) Patient Information (Medium)
Figure 30: Patient Information Shown on Different Reasonable Levels
for the serial numbers of installed devices to determine the access location, and the trust
vector formula calculates reasonableness using the location information.
Care2X generates above HTML pages using pre-defined templates. Because of the
variety of dynamically generated pages, it is impractical to write a filter that can process
all pages directly. Instead, we examine the templates that Care2X uses, and mark the
proper data fields with meta-information tags. The generated HTML pages will then in-
clude these tags. Actionlets in the interception runtime can locate these tags for policy
related meta-information, and filters can parse the HTML pages to find the right places to
apply restrictions. For example, the above pages use a template contain one line of:
{{$sSSSNr}}
representing the social security number in our experiment. We add tags to that line so it
changes to:
<TDP reasonable=“high”> {{$sSSSNr}} </TDP>
The generated page will contain HTML code as:
<TDP reasonable=“high”> <tr>
<td class = “reg_item”> SSS Nr. </td>
<td class = “reg_item”> 901010001 </td>
</tr> </TDP>
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(a) Doctor’s Daily Notes
(b) Notes of Diet Plan
Figure 31: Treatment Related Notes Shown on Medially Secured System
The next example in figure 31 shows that different treatment related notes have different
requirements on environment. We here determine the trust vectors based on whether there
are suspicious connections (to known backdoor ports). In a medially secure context, figure
31(a) has the doctor’s daily notes removed, and figure 31(b) keeps the diet plan notes in
place. Care2X uses the same template to generate HTML pages for different notes, so we
cannot directly tag a field with its security requirements. Instead, we tag the category filed,
e.g. the one showing “Doctor’s daily notes” or “Diet plan”, and then link the data fields to
the category tags.
Next we demonstrate the restricted accesses on images from an Web server. Because
an image can hardly contain the TDP meta-information by itself, we assume that the server
attaches meta-information as extra HTTP header fields. We show two different filters in
figure 32. The watermarking filter is useful for protecting one’s property, and the face
blocking filter [31] is useful for protecting one’s privacy. The context for determining the
trust vectors in this case include whether the client side program is audited, and whether it
makes connections to IP addresses not authorized. We also implement a PDF text extractor
filter to demonstrate that we can provide partial access to a PDF document by extracting
select portion of the document such as the ‘Abstract’.
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Table 8: Overhead of Various Filters on an Intel C2D 2.6GHz Node
Filter Type Time (ms)
Remove tagged data in a 18 kilobyte HTML 0.081
Extract text from a 12 page PDF 93.18
Add watermark on a 640x428 JPEG 22.67
Blocking human faces on a 640x428 JPEG 353.48
As for propagation control, we automatically apply the watermarking filter if the client
application is not the audited one. We also monitor its outgoing connections to SMTP
servers. If the email recipients’ addresses are from different domains then the owner of
the data, we apply the face blocking filter on images, and the PDF abstract filter on PDF
documents.
Table 8 lists four filters we use above — a HTML filter that removes certain tagged
fields, a PDF text extractor that extracts abstracts from papers, an image watermarking
filter, and a human face blocking filter. As shown in the table, filtering costs range from
trivial for the HTML filter, to moderate for the watermarking filer, to fairly expensive for
the PDF text extractor and the face blocking filters. The TDP’s innate monitoring overheads
are small, that its interception overheads are moderate as shown in previous chapters. The
filtering overheads when applying restriction filters entirely depend on the applications in
use and the filters they desire.
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(a) Original JPEG Image
(b) JPEG Image with Watermark
(c) JPEG Image with Face Blocked
Figure 32: Restriction Filters on JPEG Images
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This thesis addresses data sharing between services and applications that are suspected of
faulty or malicious behaviors or that run on compromised systems. Toward these ends, it
develops and presents a context flow control (CFC) model used to implement with trusted
data paths (TDPs). TDP software uses context-monitoring agents to continually analyze
system and application service behaviors to derive their current levels of trust. It ensures
that data flowing to target users will match their current trust levels using transparent traffic
interception mechanisms, specified by trust-based access control (TBAC) policies. It also
ensures end-to-end propagation controls on data, by enforcing TBAC along entire data
delivery paths.
There remain multiple issues with the current TDP implementation. This includes its
use of configuration files and associated static configuration methods. While these are
well-suited for longer running data center applications and relatively static multi-tier web
services, they are not likely appropriate for next generation dynamic service based systems
in which services freely and dynamically form associations and service agreements with
each other. Also statically configured is TDP’s knowledge about the trusted places (i.e.,
Xen’s Dom0 in our prototype) where TBAC engines can be deployed. Discovery protocols
and directory support are needed to remove restrictions like these. Another issue is the
potential fragility of the ‘chain of trust’ in the current Xen implementation, due to the
complex nature of the software running in Dom0. This can be addressed with hardware
support like the trusted platform module.
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